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[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier crea-
ture to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after 
the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgot-
ten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from the 
merely logical point of view. —O. W. HOLMES, JR. 
THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881) 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past. —O. W. Holmes 
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) 
Perhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover 
easy cases. —Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 640 n.* 
(Stevens, J., concurring) 
INTRODUCTION 
Personal jurisdiction has long been at the center of the civil procedure cur-
riculum in law school1 and constitutes an important part of law practice.2 Ser-
                                                        
1  Some civil procedure faculty report spending as many as six to eight weeks of class time 
covering personal jurisdiction. Many prominent Civil Procedure casebooks devote 100 pages 
or more to the topic and excerpt as many as a dozen personal jurisdiction cases, as well as 
presenting extensive notes on personal jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 49–117 (6th ed. 2012) (sixty-eight pages and 
twenty-four excerpted cases addressing personal jurisdiction); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 71–198 (10th ed. 2009) (127 pages and twenty-
two excerpted cases); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 
680–824 (5th ed. 2009) (144 pages and fourteen excerpted cases on personal jurisdiction); 
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 680–846 
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vice of process, a close companion, receives considerably less attention in the 
law school curriculum,3 but it is perhaps even more important to the daily prac-
tice of law.4 
The amount of class time devoted to personal jurisdiction is so great (and 
perhaps excessive) because it lends itself so well the traditional modified So-
cratic method of the classroom. Changing the facts just a little forces students 
to confront the problems of concrete application of doctrine—for example, 
“What if the defendant had intentionally shipped ten widgets into the forum 
state instead of ten thousand?” 
The law of personal jurisdiction also presents an opportunity to teach civil 
procedure as legal process, as courts traverse from the territorial sovereignty 
and international law concepts of Pennoyer5 to the minimum contacts of Inter-
national Shoe6 to the more involved modern applications of World-Wide 
                                                                                                                                
(4th ed. 2012) (166 pages and fourteen excerpted cases addressing personal jurisdiction). But 
see RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, 
AND QUESTIONS 21–142 (6th ed. 2012) (devotes 121 pages of consideration to personal juris-
diction but excerpts only nine cases); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 76–122 (2013) (devoting forty-six pages to the topic and excerpting only two 
cases). Although extensive, multi-week attention to personal jurisdiction may be excessive in 
relation to the importance of the topic in ordinary litigation, some instructors arguably go to 
the other extreme, covering the subject in a class period or less simply by setting forth con-
trolling doctrine in the area. See also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE 
SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 5–6 
(1986) (concluding that U.S. Supreme Court devotes too much attention to personal jurisdic-
tion cases and notwithstanding this investment of time has failed to provide clear guidance in 
the area to lower courts). 
2  Genuinely difficult issues of personal jurisdiction akin to those presented in law school 
casebooks are relatively rare in practice. Most lawyers correctly elect to sue only in states 
where the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. But this still reflects substan-
tial attorney planning as to the range of available forums as well as a decision as to the most 
advantageous forum. Further, even with lawyers attempting to avoid suit in a forum without 
jurisdiction, successful Rule 12(b)(2) motions, although comparatively rare, are still a fre-
quent and important aspect of civil litigation. 
3  In most civil procedure casebooks, service of process gets comparatively little attention. 
See, e.g., FREER & PERDUE, supra note 1, at 143–62 (nineteen pages and two excerpted cases 
on service); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, 199–238 (thirty-nine pages and four cases on 
service); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, 825–49 (twenty-four pages and two cases on ser-
vice); SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 828–30 (three pages and one case addressing service of 
process). But see CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 118–30 (only twelve pages but six cases 
presented); STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 118–23 (specifically addressing service of pro-
cess and personal jurisdiction), 123–48 (specifically addressing service of process as a mat-
ter of notice and due process). 
4  Although the average lawsuit does not involve serious questions regarding personal juris-
diction, all lawsuits require effective service of process to commence the action. Although 
this aspect of litigation is less intellectually interesting and more technical, formal, and rote, 
in the typical case it probably consumes more resources than analysis of personal jurisdic-
tion. 
5  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
6  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
1206 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1203  
Volkswagen,7 Helicopteros,8 Burger King,9 Keeton v. Hustler,10 Calder v. 
Jones,11 Asahi Metal,12 J. McIntyre,13 Goodyear,14 and, most recently, Daim-
ler15 and Walden v. Fiore.16 
As society changed, doctrine changed; as the law, society, and business 
further evolved, so did doctrine, arguably moving from an excessively restric-
tive attitude toward jurisdictional reach17 to one overly permissive,18 only to 
retreat somewhat in response to perceived abuses or unforeseen problems.19 
Students can be shown a history of judicial attitudes toward litigation and fair-
ness reflected in case law. Although the availability of personal jurisdiction 
generally expanded in response to the felt necessities of the time20 (the Interna-
tional Shoe line of cases),21 courts also put limits on at least one venerable form 
of jurisdiction and lawyer tool (quasi-in-rem jurisdiction) that became viewed 
as too fraught with potential for unfairness (Shaffer v. Heitner).22 
                                                        
7  World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
8  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
9  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
10  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
11  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
12  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
13  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
14  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
15  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
16  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
17  For example, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) appears to grant very broad personal 
jurisdiction over persons or property within the territorial boundaries of the state but to deny 
jurisdiction even in the compelling cases in which defendants enter a state, do harm, but then 
leave the state before they can be served with legal process. Cases between Pennoyer and 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), expanded personal jurisdiction concepts 
to reach such cases but did so only narrowly based on fairly confined notions of whether the 
defendant, even if not physically present in the state at the time of suit, had been “doing 
business” in the state. See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 83–89. 
18  See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1958) (upholding California’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Texas-based insurance company that acquired another 
insurer that had sold a single policy in California, albeit to the plaintiff’s decedent). Because 
the McGee defendant’s contact with California is so closely related to the gravamen of the 
lawsuit (refusal of the insurer to pay policy benefits to a beneficiary), I have always regarded 
the case as correctly decided even though the defendant’s quantum of contact with the forum 
state is slim. But almost all commentators agree that McGee is the Supreme Court’s most 
extensive exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
19  See infra notes 155–88 and accompanying text (discussing constriction of broad personal 
jurisdiction by Supreme Court). 
20  See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (law responds to “felt necessities of 
the time”). The Holmes gift for turning a phrase, like Shakespeare’s, has become so much a 
part of the legal lexicon that what might be termed Holmes-isms come unconsciously to 
lawyers. See id. (“The life of the law has not been logic. It has been experience.” This quote 
is another aphorism that explains a good deal of the development of personal jurisdiction). 
21  See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 48–49 and accompany-
ing text. 
22  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1977), discussed infra notes 65–87 and accom-
panying text. 
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Service of process, by contrast, tends to get short shrift in the classroom 
because it is perhaps unfairly viewed as more mechanical, better suited for on-
the-job learning, and less conducive to class discussion. While lacking in So-
cratic potential, service of process can provide some useful comic relief to 
overwrought law students. Consider the problems of “sewer service” by un-
scrupulous process servers.23 Or the challenge of bird-dogging the defendant 
trying to avoid service as the limitations period nears expiration, complete with 
inventive process servers lurking behind bushes, including the summons and 
complaint with the morning paper, tossing these papers through a window 
while wrapped around a rock, and so on. Even if such service might not actual-
ly hold up in the face of a Rule 12(b)(5) challenge,24 the examples provide use-
ful anecdotes or illustrations for the classroom.25 
But in these instances of tenacious service of the reluctant defendant, there 
is usually no question that the defendant is subject to suit in the relevant juris-
diction. In most real life litigation, there is little connection between service of 
process—a technical, mechanical, bureaucratic necessity—and personal juris-
diction, as well as no serious issue regarding the existence of personal jurisdic-
tion. Consequently, classroom illustrations about “slap” service26 done in Char-
lie Chaplin or Keystone Cops mode usually function as amusing illustrations of 
a means of giving notice rather than a means of acquiring jurisdiction. 
An exception, of course, arises when service is effectuated while the pro-
spective defendant is merely passing through the relevant jurisdiction. Such 
“transient” or “tag” jurisdiction became seemingly out of place with the Inter-
national Shoe decision, given its focus on whether the defendant had sufficient 
minimum contacts with the forum state of the lawsuit to make litigation against 
                                                        
23  Sewer service is an informal term frequently used to describe service that is allegedly 
done (usually with an unscrupulous process server’s affidavit in support) but was never in 
fact completed, with the process frequently ending up discarded (in the metaphorical sewer) 
rather than actually given to the prospective defendant or agent. See FREER & PERDUE, supra 
note 1, at 161. 
24  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) (motion to dismiss complaint may be based on improper or 
inadequate service of process plaintiff); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4) (motion to dismiss may also 
be based on defective form or content of summons). 
25  Perhaps my favorite involves a staffer at the law firm where I once worked who was seek-
ing to serve a reluctant target, a working physician. The staffer came to the medical office 
professing a need to see Dr. X. When asked whether he was a patient, the staffer replied that 
the doctor was “very familiar with my case.” The staffer, a distinguished older man and re-
tired court clerk, was ushered into an examination room and served the doctor when he sub-
sequently entered the room. 
26  In this this article, I will use the term “slap service” as well as “tag” jurisdiction and 
“transient” jurisdiction to refer to instances in which a defendant served with a summons and 
complaint as a means of initiating litigation. This type of physical, in-person service also 
connotes ambushing a defendant who, if not unwilling to accept process, is at least surprised 
by the sudden nature of the service. Tag jurisdiction is a more common term referring to 
such cases where a defendant temporarily in the forum state is “tagged” with process in the 
manner of being tagged as “it” in the familiar children’s game. The exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant in transit through a jurisdiction through service of process is per-
haps even more commonly referred to as transient jurisdiction. 
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the defendant in that state consistent with fair place and substantive justice un-
der the Due Process Clause.27 This tension became particularly palpable after 
Shaffer v. Heitner.28 
The argument against the continuing vitality of service to establish person-
al jurisdiction is a powerful one—that mere service is not a very weighty con-
tact with the forum state and should not, by itself, establish the requisite mini-
mum contacts required by International Shoe and its progeny. For example, a 
Philadelphian may drive to Southern Ohio to drop off a child at college using 
Interstate 70, which passes through a sliver of West Virginia wedged between 
Pennsylvania and Ohio. If the Pennsylvanian is served while gassing up the car 
at a truck stop near Wheeling, can this really subject the Philadelphian to a law-
suit in West Virginia? Even for a lawsuit over events having no connection to 
West Virginia? The common sense answer under a minimum contacts/fairness 
analysis is that, without more, this slim amount of contact with the forum state 
cannot make it fair to subject this transient driver to a lawsuit in West Virginia 
over a dispute centered elsewhere. 
This hypothetical can easily be made more unfair if the college drop-off 
trip does not involve a litigation forum state adjacent to the defendant’s own 
domicile. Consider, for example, a Californian who flies to Pittsburgh, rents a 
car, and then drives to Ohio, being served at the Wheeling truck stop in a law-
suit involving a real estate dispute in Florida. Should the Californian really 
have to defend himself in a West Virginia court? And what if service were ef-
fectuated by a former Navy Seal who, while suspended from a helicopter keep-
ing pace with the Californian on a West Virginia stretch of I-70, induces the 
driver to roll down the window and then hands the summons through the win-
dow? 
If the Philadelphian or Californian is involved in an automobile collision in 
West Virginia on such a trip, the questions of contact and fairness are, of 
course, quite different. The defendant has now had substantial, palpable, injuri-
ous contact with the forum state in connection with a matter related to the law-
suit. Only the most restrictive of pre-International Shoe courts would deny per-
sonal jurisdiction in such cases. But providing what is essentially general 
personal jurisdiction over any defendant with the misfortune of being served 
while in the forum state, however briefly or episodically, was always hard to 
square with the due process fairness approach of International Shoe. 
At least as an intellectual endeavor, continuing to treat slap service as es-
tablishing general personal jurisdiction because the defendant was “tagged” 
with process while briefly in the forum state became increasingly difficult after 
                                                        
27  See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 48–49 and accompany-
ing text. 
28  See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text, discussing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 
(1977) and scholarly reaction to the decision. 
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Shaffer v. Heitner.29 In Shaffer, the Court required that another venerable juris-
dictional gambit—quasi-in-rem jurisdiction30—comport with the minimum 
contacts approach of International Shoe. If quasi-in-rem jurisdiction must satis-
fy the minimum contacts/due process test, then surely the same would logically 
be required of slap service and transient jurisdiction absent extenuating circum-
stances.31 
                                                        
29  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210–12 (1977), discussed infra notes 65–87 and ac-
companying text. 
30  Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is the attachment of a defendant’s property in the state as a 
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even if the defendant is not oth-
erwise subject to personal jurisdiction, through quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction, the de-
fendant can be sued in the state of attachment—even over matters unrelated to the proper-
ty—but any judgment against the defendant cannot exceed the value of the attached proper-
property. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 107–08 (6th ed. 2011). 
31  Although this article argues for the elimination of tag jurisdiction as a general matter, I 
concede that there may be a place for continued use of service to establish personal jurisdic-
tion in cases where a defendant would otherwise avoid justice. For example, if there is no 
practical alternative forum for suing a defendant (e.g., a foreign dictator who seldom leaves 
his military compound) that has caused injury but is not subject to specific personal jurisdic-
tion (discussed infra notes 52–62 and accompanying text), upholding personal jurisdiction 
while serving the dictator at an airport, seaport, or vacation hotel may be justified as neces-
sary to vindicating substantive legal rights. This type of jurisdiction-by-necessity-for-justice 
thinking may undergird modern cases that exercise tag jurisdiction without much seeming 
reflection on the potential unfairness of such exercises of jurisdiction or its inconsistency 
with the minimum contacts construct. See, e.g..DGLFY.DUDGåLü)GG&LU
1995) (upholding personal jurisdiction in Alien Tort Claims Act cases on basis of service 
during U.S. visit over alleged ringleader of atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina) (citing Burn-
ham); Bourassa v. Desrochers, 938 F.2d 1056, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding service of 
process during Florida trip sufficient for exercise of personal jurisdiction over Canadian citi-
zen accused of fraud); Schinkel v. Maxi-Holding, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1219, 1222–23 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991) (asserting personal jurisdiction over Finland resident on Massachusetts vaca-
tion) (embracing Scalia’s position in Burnham). But outside the topic of human rights abuses 
(for example, the Kadic court noted that suit in the former Yugoslavia was not a realistic op-
tion, 70 F.3d at 250), in almost any such hypothetical one can create, it would also seem pos-
sible to sue the defendant in at least one forum related to the underlying lawsuit, which 
would permit long-arm specific personal jurisdiction that eliminates the need for tag jurisdic-
tion. For example in Bourassa v. Desrochers, the defendant solicited the business of plain-
tiff, a California resident, through calls to her home and that purportedly swindled her into 
paying for land that defendant misappropriated for profit, causing injury to plaintiff in her 
home state of California. 938 F.2d at 1057. Less clearly, in Schinkel v. Maxi-Holding, the 
defendant appears to have reached out to contract with the Massachusetts based plaintiff and 
then caused harm to plaintiff felt in Massachusetts (but the court did not discuss the defend-
ant’s contacts in any detail because it was content to base personal jurisdiction on service 
alone). 565 N.E.2d at 1221. Although the Supreme Court’s most recent specific personal ju-
risdiction case of Walden v. Fiore may prompt some doubt (see infra notes 183–88 and ac-
companying text), it would seem that there is no due process bar to exercises of jurisdiction 
in Bourassa and Schinkel (although state long-arm statutes may not be satisfied). To the ex-
tent this analysis is incorrect, it may indicate that Walden v. Fiore is more problematic than 
has been appreciated to date. Just the same, it would seem that defendants outside a forum 
state that intentionally cause injury within the forum state should logically be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction irrespective of whether physical service of process takes place. Further, in 
real world litigation, a bigger problem with such elusive defendants will not be obtaining 
personal jurisdiction (e.g., the dictator’s bodyguards rough up plaintiff and plaintiff sues in 
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Or so one would have thought. In the Court’s subsequent decision in Burn-
ham v. Superior Court,32 however, the plurality opinion embraced the contin-
ued efficacy of tag jurisdiction—on the basis of historical use alone—arguably 
giving tag jurisdiction or slap service higher status than quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion, even though the latter is at least as defensible as the former. But, as dis-
cussed below,33 such a reading of Burnham is overbroad in light of the frac-
tured nature of the Court and hedged rhetoric in that case. Nonetheless, for rea-
reasons that are both puzzling and troubling, many commentators and courts 
writing after Burnham have largely treated Justice Scalia’s opinion as broadly 
endorsing tag jurisdiction as black letter law even though it only commanded 
three votes. Arguably, the opinion garnered four votes, in that Justice White’s 
concurrence was generally supportive of tag jurisdiction but open to subjecting 
it to greater scrutiny if it proved problematic.34 A closer reading of Burnham 
makes clear that a majority of the modern Supreme Court has never endorsed 
service alone as conclusively establishing general personal jurisdiction in the 
absence of some additional significant defendant contact with the forum state. 
Both the judiciary’s overenthusiastic overreading of Burnham and the ten-
sion between slap service or tag jurisdiction, minimum contacts analysis, and 
due process have become even more pronounced in the wake of the Court’s re-
cent decisions in Goodyear35 and Daimler.36 In these two cases, the Court nar-
rowed the availability of general personal jurisdiction, essentially making such 
jurisdiction easily available only in a defendant’s home state (or home states in 
the case of defendants who can be said to be “at home” in more than one state). 
To the extent Burnham is incorrectly read as making service of process the 
equivalent of general personal jurisdiction, this twenty-five-year-old precedent 
is completely inconsistent with the solicitude expressed for general jurisdiction 
defendants in Goodyear and Daimler. 
Part I of this article briefly reviews the history and modern jurisprudence of 
transient jurisdiction via service of process on defendants. It sites this basis for 
jurisdiction in the larger context of evolving judicial doctrine on personal juris-
diction from Pennoyer to the present. This article in particular looks at Grace v. 
MacArthur37—perhaps the outer limit of use of service upon a transient (while 
                                                                                                                                
his home state where the roughing took place or the plaintiff continued to suffer injury) so 
much as collecting on a judgment (e.g., the dictator may not have assets outside the state of 
his military dominance). 
32  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990), discussed infra notes 139–53 and 
accompanying text. 
33  See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
34  See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
35  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011), dis-
cussed infra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. 
36  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014), discussed infra notes 171–82 and 
accompanying text. 
37  Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959), discussed infra notes 90–
109 and accompanying text. 
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on a plane flight over state airspace) to establish personal jurisdiction, and the 
puzzling manner in which MacArthur has been and continues to be erroneously 
treated as authoritative. Part II reviews Burnham and highlights what many 
courts appear to have missed: Burnham did not make service alone sufficient 
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction; Justice Scalia’s opinion should not be 
treated as authoritative based on perceived concessions in Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence; and a majority of the Court required something more than mere 
service of process to support personal jurisdiction. Part III introduces into the 
mix Goodyear and Daimler and illustrates how both the holdings and the rea-
sonings of these cases make slap service (and the continuing vitality of MacAr-
thur and the Scalia opinion in Burnham) untenable. The article concludes by 
reiterating the scholarly community’s longstanding call for a more integrated 
treatment of all personal jurisdiction questions that would be fairer and more 
consistent than the present regime. 
I. JURISDICTION BY SERVICE ALONE: THE ROAD  
TO MACARTHUR AND BURNHAM 
A. From Territoriality to Minimum Contacts 
Although tag jurisdiction is typically viewed as established procedure of 
ancient origin (and of longstanding “pedigree,” to use the language of Justice 
Scalia in endorsing its continued vitality in Burnham38), the most extensive le-
gal scholarship on the topic has persuasively argued to the contrary. Professor 
Albert Ehrenzweig’s review of historical precedent concluded that until Pen-
noyer v. Neff,39 courts focused primarily on whether the forum was an ade-
quately convenient location for subjecting the defendant to a lawsuit.40 
Pennoyer41 enshrined transient jurisdiction in America, wrongfully so in 
Ehrenzweig’s view. By focusing on the territorial limits of the states’ judicial 
                                                        
38  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990). 
39  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
40  Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth 
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 290–91 (1956). But see Rhonda Wasserman, The 
Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37, 49–51 (1989) (appearing to 
characterize pre-Pennoyer historical practice as consistent with Pennoyer). More important, 
perhaps, in Burnham, Justice Scalia (and three other justices) appear to view slap service and 
tag jurisdiction as well-established prior to Pennoyer. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 
U.S. 604, 613–14 (1990), but Justice Brennan (also joined by three justices) embraced Eh-
renzweig’s historical analysis as authoritative. See id. at 634. 
41  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714. Pennoyer was an ejectment action brought in federal court un-
der the diversity jurisdiction. Pennoyer, the defendant in that action, held the land under a 
deed purchased in a sheriff’s sale conducted to satisfy a judgment for attorney’s fees ob-
tained against Neff in a previous action by one Mitchell. At the time of Mitchell’s suit in an 
Oregon state court, Neff was a nonresident of Oregon. An Oregon statute allowed service by 
publication on nonresidents with property in the State. Mitchell had used that procedure to 
bring Neff before the court. The United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon, in 
which Neff brought his ejectment action, refused to recognize the validity of the judgment 
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powers, Pennoyer both unduly limited a state’s ability to exercise personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant outside its borders and gave the state excessively 
unbridled power over any defendant who could be physically found within state 
borders. 
Notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings and the virtually unanimous 
criticism of the law of personal jurisdiction, efforts for judicial or legislative re-
form have been decisively impeded by the assumption, so forcefully supported 
by the author of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, that our rules of personal 
jurisdiction are of ancient common law origin. . . . [N]otwithstanding dogmatic 
generalizations later sanctioned by the Restatement, appellate courts hardly ever 
in fact held transient service sufficient as such. Indeed, courts apparently had 
occasion only rarely to proceed upon such service, since state statutes, as yet 
[prior to Pennoyer] unrestricted by constitutional demand, quite liberally permit-
ted suits against absent defendants, leaving it to the courts to determine whether 
they properly had jurisdiction in a given case. Forum conveniens—to use an un-
usual, but I believe helpful, phrase—was, in this sense, the basis of all personal 
jurisdiction. 
. . . Only when transient service, hitherto a harmless adjunct of convenient 
jurisdiction, thus came to be required for the establishment of personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants, did such service also become generally suffi-
cient for this purpose. . . . The common law and common sense jurisdiction of 
the forum conveniens yielded to a dogmatic rule of personal service precariously 
balanced by a doctrine of forum non conveniens.42 
                                                                                                                                
against Neff in Mitchell’s suit, and accordingly awarded the land to Neff. The Supreme 
Court affirmed. Id. at 722–33; see also STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 83–84 (summarizing 
Pennoyer). Pennoyer took the view that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sov-
ereignty over persons and property within its territory, but a state cannot exercise authority 
over persons or property outside its boundaries. If a defendant consented to the jurisdiction 
of the state courts or was personally served within the state, the state could exercise personal 
jurisdiction. Direct assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction exceeded the inherent limits of the 
state’s power, making any such resulting judgment unenforceable in other states and not en-
titled to full faith and credit as well as being void in the rendering state because it had been 
obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pennoy-
er, 95 U.S. at 729–33. This analysis led to the conclusion that Mitchell’s judgment against 
Neff could not be validly based on the state’s power over persons within its borders because 
Neff had not been personally served in Oregon, nor had he consensually appeared before the 
Oregon court. Pennoyer also ruled that the action could not be sustained on the basis of the 
state’s power over property within its borders because that property had not been brought 
before the court by attachment or any other procedure prior to judgment. Since the judgment 
which authorized the sheriff’s sale was therefore invalid, the sale transferred no title, and 
Neff regained his land. Id. 
42  Ehrenzweig, supra note 40, at 292 (footnotes omitted) (finding that only two of nineteen 
cases cited by Restatement support its position). The Restatement to which Ehrenzweig re-
fers is RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), whose primary author was Harvard Law 
Professor Joseph Beale. Beale famously championed the formalist approach of lex loci delic-
ti in which the place of injury provided the applicable law of the case regardless of its con-
nection to the parties’ home states and public policy concerns. Because of his unrelenting 
legal formalism, Beale became a target of the legal realist movement and this approach to 
conflict, although retaining significant support in some quarters, was largely pushed aside by 
the “most significant relationship” test of the ALI’s Second Restatement published in 1971. 
See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 242–45; see also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
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But after Pennoyer, it was generally held that service of process upon a de-
fendant in the forum state was enough to confer jurisdiction, even if the de-
fendant was merely passing through and had no non-transient ties to the state. 
Although Ehrenzweig’s historical analysis was never refuted, neither did it 
prompt courts to back away from the view that tag jurisdiction was constitu-
tionally endorsed by Pennoyer. However, over time, other developments re-
garding personal jurisdiction would raise questions as to the continued permis-
sibility of tag jurisdiction. As discussed below, the territoriality rationale and 
framework of Pennoyer came under increasing criticism. Twenty years after 
Ehrenzweig’s article, this criticism would manifest itself in changes to the doc-
trine of quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction that had grown up in the wake of 
Pennoyer.43 Under this doctrine, if a plaintiff could attach nonresident property 
within the forum state, then the state could exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant but could only enforce a judgment up to the amount of the value 
of the attached property.44 
Regardless of the correct history of tag jurisdiction via service of process 
within the state alone, Pennoyer and its emphasis on state sovereignty within 
physical borders established a regime in which service was deemed sufficient 
                                                                                                                                
YALE 1927–1960, at 101 (2001) (legal realists on Yale Law faculty directed derision at 
Beale, including a mocking poem posted in faculty lounge). In addition to providing a win-
dow into academic debate during the twentieth century, the Beale-Ehrenzweig dispute over 
the historical roots of tag jurisdiction reflects an ongoing formalism-vs.-functionalism divide 
in American law, as well as providing an additional lens for viewing Burnham. As discussed 
below, the four-justice Scalia plurality in Burnham is highly formalist: service upon a de-
fendant in the jurisdiction is conclusive of personal jurisdiction regardless of any other fac-
tors. Scalia grounds this formalism not only on his preference for this line of analysis (see 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–77 
(1989)), but on purported strength of tag jurisdiction has supposedly ancient roots, a history 
that may be in error. This is not to say that formalism is inherently bad. See Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits of Erie Formalism, 
44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 970 (2011) (supporting Justice Scalia’s formalist approach to proce-
dure-substance divide presented by Erie questions). However, a narrow formalism that pays 
no attention to a doctrine’s consistency with the rest of an area of law or overall considera-
tions of fairness to defendants—the formalism of Burnham’s plurality opinion—has little to 
recommend it. 
43  See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text, discussing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 
(1977). 
44  The theory underlying quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is that it provided fairness lacking by 
mere publication or other means of notifying nonresident defendants that were not as tangi-
ble as personal service. In particular, the doctrine assumed that nonresidents were construc-
tively aware of the status of their property and thus would be sufficiently alerted to an at-
tachment and likely have notice of the action, particularly when attachment was followed by 
substituted service such as a mailing indicating the attachment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958). Pen-
noyer also confirmed the constitutionality of in rem jurisdiction, in which a state exercises 
judicial control over property physically located in the state and can adjudicate questions of 
ownership, use, value, and so on, even if the owner of the property is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727–30. 
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by most courts, perhaps most infamously in Grace v. MacArthur45 (discussed 
below), when service was effected at thirty thousand feet as the defendant flew 
over the forum state. In the half-century after Pennoyer, little attention was fo-
cused on this area of law but much attention was trained on the problem of es-
tablishing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants for injuries arising out of 
their activities in the forum state. Courts expanded the reach of the states to 
nonresident defendants, who, because of their nonresidence, were difficult to 
personally serve within the state unless an enterprising plaintiff was able to 
track their movements and effect physical service during the comparatively 
brief time the defendant was on state soil (or in its airspace). For example, cor-
porations doing business in the state were deemed to have consented to the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction or to be “present” in the state due to their business activi-
ties and thus subject to service.46 
Expanding automobile travel and its attendant increase in injury and litiga-
tion in states where parties were not normally amenable to service created an 
additional important tension between the nineteenth-century territoriality rule 
of Pennoyer and twentieth-century life. The tension was resolved by adopting 
the legal fiction that a driver using the roads of a state had “consented” to suit 
in the state (at least for injuries arising out of use of the vehicle), and had con-
structively appointed the secretary of state or a similar official as agent for ser-
vice of process.47 
By 1945, when the key case of International Shoe v. Washington48 came to 
the Court, the deficiencies of post-Pennoyer legal fictions had become suffi-
ciently vexing, particularly regarding the notions of corporate “presence” in a 
state. As such, the Court was persuaded to take a significant step away from 
Pennoyer’s territoriality—at least with respect to the forum state’s ability to 
reach out and exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that was not phys-
ically within the state and subject to service. Famously, International Shoe 
concluded, “[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he 
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”49 
Although the Court’s use of the word “present” raised some issue for de-
bate, the thrust of the opinion made clear that courts should now focus on 
                                                        
45  Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
46  See, e.g., Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917); Int’l Har-
vester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 589, 589 (1914). Pennoyer itself also stated that in cases 
involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce actions, the plaintiff’s home 
state could issue a judgment on status without personal service upon the absent defendant. 
See 95 U.S. at 733–35. Regarding decisions expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants after Pennoyer, see Developments in the Law: State-Court Ju-
risdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919–23 (1960). 
47  See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
48  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
49  Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the state “as make it reason-
able, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corpora-
tion [or other defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”50 
International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis of course had the practical ef-
fect of expanding jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Businesses might 
have sufficient tangible presence in a state to be subject to suit there if they 
conducted sales activity or intentionally engaged in management activity—at 
least for lawsuits arising out of that activity—even if the businesses themselves 
were not actually “present” in the jurisdiction. 
B. The Intellectual Underpinnings of Tag Jurisdiction Weaken with Modern 
Minimum Contacts Jurisprudence 
The post-International Shoe world was one of largely expanding personal 
jurisdiction, with some later retrenchment, as well as retrenchment regarding 
the quasi-in-rem arm of territorially based personal jurisdiction. It also saw the 
articulation of two separate lines of personal jurisdictional analysis based on 
the degree to which a defendant’s contacts with the forum state were related to 
the facts of the lawsuit. Despite these developments, the courts and commenta-
tors have continued to treat the far-reaching use of tag jurisdiction as constitu-
tionally permissible rather than as a bygone relic of Pennoyer’s theory of per-
sonal jurisdiction based on territoriality and physicality. 
1. “Specific” and “General” Personal Jurisdiction 
In the “modern” era of personal jurisdiction since the 1945 International 
Shoe v. Washington decision,51 courts have (assuming service of process was 
proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4) focused on whether the 
defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state to make the exercise of 
jurisdiction there sufficiently fair, thereby satisfying due process. Two catego-
ries of personal jurisdiction emerged: “specific” jurisdiction, for cases in which 
the defendant’s contacts with the state bore some relation to the substantive 
claims of the lawsuit (e.g., shipment of a defective product that injured the 
plaintiff user) and “general” jurisdiction that was available where the defendant 
had sufficient “continuous and systematic” contacts with the state to make it 
fair to sue the defendant in that state even if the defendant’s alleged wrongdo-
ing took place outside the state and had not particular connection to the state.52 
                                                        
50  Id. at 317. 
51  See id. 
52  See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 
723–27 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 
610 (1988) (defining general personal jurisdiction as “dispute-blind, based on affiliations 
between the forum and one of the parties without regard to the nature of the dispute” while 
“[s]pecific jurisdiction is dispute-specific, based only on affiliations between the forum and 
the controversy”). 
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Over the years, most litigated disputes over personal jurisdiction have in-
volved specific jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction. For example, in the 
seventy years since International Shoe, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided 
scores of specific personal jurisdiction cases but only four general jurisdictions 
cases.53 In specific jurisdiction cases, jurisdiction expanded significantly after 
International Shoe, perhaps reaching an apogee in McGee v. International Life 
Ins. Co.,54 which approved exercise of personal jurisdiction by California 
courts over a Texas-based insurance company that serviced a single policy in 
California (plaintiff’s), but had not otherwise directed any activity toward the 
forum state. Beginning in 1979, however, the Court appeared to cut back on the 
reach of specific jurisdiction, at least in cases where jurisdiction was founded 
upon mobile goods that had come to the forum state in indirect fashion.55 
Recent specific personal jurisdiction cases J. McIntyre v. Nicastro56 and 
Walden v. Fiore57 have been consistent with this more constrained view of the 
reach of minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction but appear not to 
have dramatically curtailed the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. For 
example, courts since Nicastro have upheld specific personal jurisdiction on the 
basis of the defendant injecting its goods into the “stream of commerce” with 
                                                        
53  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 407 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
54  McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The policy in question had been sold 
by Empire Mutual Ins. Co., an Arizona company, to Californian Lowell Franklin. Plaintiff 
McGee was the beneficiary. Defendant International Life acquired Empire Mutual’s book of 
business but itself never conducted activity in California or directed toward California, save 
for billing and collecting on Franklin’s life insurance policy. The Court concluded that al-
though “there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amendable to suit in Califor-
nia where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due pro-
cess.” See id. at 224. Although the defendant insurer did not have a great quantum of contact 
with California, requiring it to defend its refusal to pay a California policyholder in Califor-
nia does not seem particularly unfair. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead—Long 
Live Pennoyer: McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. and Jurisdiction Over Individuals, 
30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 285 (1958) (supporting decision). 
55  See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (deciding Tai-
wanese tire value manufacturer not subject to personal jurisdiction in California in connec-
tion with tire blow-out on motorcycle that injured California plaintiff despite valvemaker’s 
shipment of product to motorcycle manufacturer known to sell vehicles in California); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding New York auto 
retailer not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma merely because it was foreseeable 
that buyer might use vehicle to travel to Oklahoma were it was involved in collision). But 
see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (concluding Michigan-based fast-
food franchisee had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to support constitutional exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction based on defendant’s volitional activities in contracting with 
Florida-based franchisor). 
56  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), discussed infra notes 166–70 
and accompanying text. 
57  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
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clear intent to serve markets in the forum state58 or engaging in conduct that 
had distinctly targeted the forum state or had reasonably foreseeable effects in 
the forum state.59 Similarly, where a defendant from another jurisdiction had 
intentionally hacked into a computer system in the forum state, personal juris-
diction was found for an action arising out of misappropriation of trade secrets 
facilitated by the hacking.60 
Although the Supreme Court has decided only four general jurisdiction 
cases, two (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown61 and Daimler 
AG v. Bauman62) were issued after 2010 and appear to have narrowed the situa-
tions in which general jurisdiction is available in a more dramatic manner than 
Nicastro or Walden v. Fiore has constrained specific personal jurisdiction.63 
2. Shaffer v. Heitner and the Partial Death Knell of Purely Territorial 
Exercises of Personal Jurisdiction 
As the International Shoe regime displaced the Pennoyer paradigm, ques-
tions remained not only regarding the limits of jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants based on their business activities but also about the continued validity 
of quasi-in-rem and transient jurisdiction via service of process. As discussed 
below,64 some commentators and courts saw International Shoe as inconsistent 
with tag jurisdiction, while most courts continued to view it as viable. Quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction, however, was not so long lived. 
                                                        
58  See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013). But see Kason 
Indus., Inc. v. Dent Design Hardware, Ltd., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (plaintiffs 
failure to aver any patent infringement by defendant in forum state; also no general jurisdic-
tion because plaintiff averred to defendant incorporation, headquarters, or other substantial 
presence in forum state; mere sales, even if extensive, insufficient to confer general personal 
jurisdiction). 
59  See, e.g., Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ar-
kansas corporation could be sued for copyright infringement in Washington, which was the 
state copyright holder was located even where defendant had no other contact with Washing-
ton because infringement had impact in Washington). 
60  See MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012) (Canadian employee’s use of 
Connecticut employer’s computer system, which had server physically located in Connecti-
cut, was sufficient minimum contact to support specific personal jurisdiction). However, a 
Canadian broker who was providing services through the conventional means of telephone 
and mail and directing shipments of goods that entered the state but were not directly 
shipped and who had never visited Missouri was found not to be subject to personal jurisdic-
tion there. See Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Bassett & Walker Int’l, Inc., 702 F.3d 472 (8th 
Cir. 2012). 
61  131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
62  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
63  See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text discussing Nicastro and see supra notes 
183–93 and accompanying text discussing Walden v. Fiore, and the contraction of general 
personal jurisdiction as contrasted to the expansive reach of general jurisdiction via tag ser-
vice of process pursuant to Burnham. 
64  See supra notes 81–90 and accompanying text. 
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Shaffer v. Heitner began as enterprising plaintiff Heitner, pursuing a share-
holder’s derivative suit against Greyhound and Greyhound Lines, filed suit in 
Delaware, seeking to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over current or former 
officers or directors on the basis of their stock holdings in parent company 
Greyhound. These stock holdings were considered to be property situated in 
Delaware, the state of the companies’ incorporation, where the shares were reg-
istered even if not physically present in the state.65 Subsidiary Greyhound 
Lines, Inc. was incorporated in California with a principal place of business in 
Arizona. The activities complained of occurred in Oregon.66 Plaintiff Heitner 
initially effected jurisdiction through an order of sequestration of the shares 
pursuant to a state statute, identifying the property as the common stock owned 
by the director and officer defendants. 
Pursuant to [the order of sequestration], the sequestrator “seized” approximately 
82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to 19 of the defendants, 
and options belonging to another 2 defendants. These seizures were accom-
plished by placing “stop transfer” orders or their equivalents on the books of the 
Greyhound Corp. So far as the record shows, none of the certificates represent-
ing the seized property was physically present in Delaware. The stock was con-
sidered to be in Delaware, and so subject to seizure, by virtue of Del. Code 
Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 (1975), which makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all 
stock in Delaware corporations.67 
Even under a system strongly supportive of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, this 
effort to bring nonresident directors under the authority of Delaware courts 
would raise the eyebrows of most observers in view of the nonexistent physical 
connection between the tangible property at issue and the forum state. There 
was a connection between the defendants and their property rights of stock 
ownership, but it was quite attenuated. Although a shareholder’s derivative ac-
tion often examines corporate conduct (and Delaware was the state in which the 
corporation in question was domiciled), it is not a corporate governance action 
per se that would make a strong case for forcing nonresident director and of-
ficer defendants to face litigation in Delaware absent other contacts with the 
state.68 
                                                        
65  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189–90 (1977) (“In essence, Heitner alleged that the 
individual defendants had violated their duties to Greyhound by causing it and its subsidiary 
to engage in actions that resulted in the corporations being held liable for substantial damag-
es in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal contempt action.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
66  Id. at 190 nn.2–3 (A judgment of more than $13 million was entered against Greyhound 
in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977); Greyhound and 
Greyhound Lines were fined $100,000 and $500,00 respectively in United States v. Grey-
hound Corp., 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974)). 
67  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 191–92 (footnotes omitted). 
68  In the wake of Shaffer’s invalidation of the stock sequestration mode of quasi-in-rem ju-
risdiction, the Delaware legislature amended the statute to provide that anyone agreeing to be 
a director or officer of a Delaware-charted corporation consents to personal jurisdiction in 
Delaware courts. Thus, although the instant defendants won an important battle in Shaffer v. 
Heitner, they arguably lost the larger war of trying to avoid personal jurisdiction in a compa-
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Thus, the stage was set for re-examination of the quasi-in-rem concept and 
perhaps an attempt to harmonize this method of obtaining personal jurisdiction 
with the post-International Shoe world of minimum contacts jurisdiction. The 
Court seized the opportunity and not only struck down the use of legally ficti-
tious stock sequestration but also declared quasi-in-rem jurisdiction—and all 
forms of obtaining personal jurisdiction—subject to the minimum contacts 
analysis set forth in International Shoe. In barring the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over nonresidents on the basis of the attached shares of stock alone, 
the Court made statements that, even if read narrowly, would seem to command 
that a fairness or reasonableness inquiry accompany any exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by any means if the exercise is to comport with due process. 
The Delaware courts rejected appellants’ jurisdictional challenge by noting 
that this suit was brought as a quasi in rem proceeding. Since quasi in rem juris-
diction is traditionally based on attachment or seizure of property present in the 
jurisdiction, not on contacts between the defendant and the State, the courts con-
sidered appellants’ claimed lack of contacts with Delaware to be unimportant. 
This categorical analysis assumes the continued soundness of the conceptual 
structure founded on the century-old case of Pennoyer v. Neff.69 
*   *   * 
The Pennoyer rules [that the state was all-powerful over persons or proper-
ty within its borders but had no power outside those borders] generally favored 
nonresident defendants by making them harder to sue. This advantage was re-
duced, however, by the ability of a resident plaintiff to satisfy a claim against a 
nonresident defendant by bringing into court any property of the defendant lo-
cated in the plaintiff’s State.70 
*   *   * 
[In International Shoe,] the Court began its analysis of [the jurisdictional] ques-
tion by noting that the historical basis of in personam jurisdiction was a court’s 
power over the defendant’s person. That power, however, was no longer the cen-
tral concern: 
“But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to per-
sonal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he 
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
                                                                                                                                
ny’s state of incorporation. This result, although based on arguably coercive consent ob-
tained as a condition of being a director or officer, squares well with the Court’s more recent 
general jurisdiction decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, discussed infra notes 158–65 & 
171–82, which focused on a company’s state of incorporation and state of principal place of 
business as logically fair locations for litigation against a company. Notwithstanding some 
arguable elements of coercion, it also meets a standard of fairness and reasonableness. Direc-
tors and officers are ordinarily well compensated for their service, are usually already per-
sons of wealth and means, and can easily refuse to accept any managerial post or director-
ship if they dislike being subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of the corporation with 
which they are affiliated. Of course, this same reasonableness makes the exercise of quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction invalidated in Shaffer v. Heitner far fairer and more reasonable than many 
instances of tag jurisdiction by service of process. 
69  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 196. 
70  Id. at 200. 
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mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 
Thus, the inquiry into the State’s jurisdiction over a foreign corporation ap-
propriately focused not on whether the corporation was “present” but on whether 
there have been “such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as 
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to re-
quire the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”71 
Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant’s activities in the 
forum could not resolve the question of reasonableness: 
“Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the qual-
ity and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly admin-
istration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause 
to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make bind-
ing a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant 
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”72 
As the Shaffer Court observed, the “immediate effect of” International 
Shoe’s “departure from Pennoyer’s conceptual apparatus was to increase the 
ability of the state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants” but “[n]o equally dramatic change has occurred in the law governing 
jurisdiction in rem. There have, however, been intimations that the collapse of 
the in personam wing of Pennoyer has not left that decision unweakened as a 
foundation for in rem jurisdiction.” 
The Court noted, “Well-reasoned lower court opinions have questioned the 
proposition that the presence of property in a State gives that State jurisdiction 
to adjudicate rights to the property regardless of the relationship of the underly-
ing dispute and the property owner to the forum.”73 The Court further observed, 
“The overwhelming majority of commentators have also rejected Pennoyer’s 
premise that a proceeding ‘against’ property is not a proceeding against the 
owners of that property. Accordingly, they urge” that International Shoe’s fair-
ness and reasonableness criteria “also govern [state] power to adjudicate per-
sonal rights to property located in the State.”74 
                                                        
71  Id. at 203 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
72  Id. at 203–04 (citations omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
319 (1945)). The Shaffer Court also observed that “[a]s the language quoted indicates, the 
International Shoe Court believed that the standard it was setting forth governed actions 
against natural persons as well as corporations, and we see no reason to disagree” although 
“[t]he differences between individuals and corporations may, of course, lead to the conclu-
sion that a given set of circumstances establishes state jurisdiction over one type of defend-
ant but not over the other.” Id. at 204 n.19. 
73  Id. at 205 (citing cases). 
74  Id. at 205 (citing (in this order) Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Roger Traynor, Is 
This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959); Ehrenzweig, supra note 40; 
Developments in the Law, supra note 46; and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of 
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241 (1965)). This aspect of the Shaffer Court’s 
opinion is something more than a court string-citing favorable authority aligning with a con-
clusion the court has already reached. The articles cited are by frequency of citation and stat-
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Having so set the stage, the Shaffer Court made clear that it was, depending 
on one’s view, either changing the law of in rem and quasi-in-rem personal ju-
risdiction or (perhaps belatedly) expressly recognizing that it had been implicit-
ly changed by International Shoe.75 The Court explained that jurisdiction over 
property is in effect jurisdiction over the property’s owner as well and that 
“[t]his recognition leads to the conclusion” that exercises of in rem jurisdiction 
must still satisfy “the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International 
Shoe.”76 
Applying the minimum contacts test and its necessary inquiry into the fair-
ness and reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident, non-
domiciliary defendant, the Court struck down the Delaware courts’ exercise of 
jurisdiction over the Greyhound officers and directors with no ties to the state 
other than their intangibly sequestered company stock.77 Although predicting 
that its decision would not affect most litigation because of the variety of ties 
defendants have to a forum state, the Court made clear that quasi-in-rem juris-
diction was no longer permissible solely because of its historically accepted 
status.78 
Concluding with a bit of a flourish after an extensive refutation of argu-
ments supporting jurisdiction in the case, the Shaffer Court provided a rather 
clear declaration in support of applying the minimum contacts fair-
ness/reasonableness template to not only quasi-in-rem jurisdiction but to tag 
transient jurisdiction as well. 
                                                                                                                                
ure among the most important personal jurisdiction articles of the 1950s and 1960s and were 
largely written by the leading legal scholars in the area, including one (former Cal-Berkeley 
law professor and California Chief Justice Roger Traynor) who was widely regarded as the 
finest state court judge of the era. 
75  Id. at 206 (“It is clear, therefore, that the law of state-court jurisdiction no longer stands 
securely on the foundation established in Pennoyer. We think that the time is ripe to consider 
whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should 
be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.” (footnote omitted)) (citing to, inter 
alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 68, cmt. c (noting that the exercise of 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) “might be thought incon-
sistent with the basic principle of reasonableness”)). 
76  Id. at 207. 
77  Id. at 208–09, 216–17. 
78  See id. at 208–09. 
It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction over many types of actions which now are or might 
be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdic-
tion must satisfy the International Shoe standard. For the type of quasi in rem action typified by 
Harris v. Balk and the present case, however, accepting the proposed analysis would result in 
significant change. These are cases where the property which now serves as the basis for state-
court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Thus, although the 
presence of the defendant’s property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among 
the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support 
the State’s jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now 
thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 209–16 (considering and rejecting prudential, public 
policy, or practicality arguments in favor of retaining traditional approach to quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction). 
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The Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make bind-
ing a judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the 
state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”  
Delaware’s assertion of jurisdiction over appellants in this case is incon-
sistent with that constitutional limitation on state power. The judgment of the 
Delaware Supreme Court must, therefore, be reversed.79 
Earlier in the opinion, the Shaffer Court had summarized its assessment in 
the now oft-quoted passage stating that the Court concluded, “[A]ll assertions 
of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth 
in International Shoe and its progeny.”80 Regarding quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, 
the Court emphasized, “The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over proper-
ty is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property 
supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued 
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamen-
tally unfair to the defendant.”81 
Although Shaffer v. Heitner does not expressly require that tag jurisdiction 
be eliminated or measured according to a minimum contacts yardstick, this is 
the most reasonable reading of Shaffer.82 If a state cannot exert jurisdiction by 
taking control over property within the state, how logically can it acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction (and general personal jurisdiction at that) over a nonresident 
defendant—over any claim at all against the defendant—merely because the 
defendant was served with process while passing through the state, however 
briefly or trivially? 
To ask the question (albeit a rhetorical one) is to answer it. Logically, to be 
consistent with International Shoe and Shaffer, transient jurisdiction must in-
volve service on a defendant that has sufficient minimum contacts with the fo-
                                                        
79  Id. at 216–17 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
80  Id. at 212. 
81  Id. 
82  See David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction—A Speculation 
on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 273, 303 (1978) (arguing that tag 
jurisdiction could not satisfy due process under analysis used by the Court in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner); see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
33 (1978) (same). Accord Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on 
State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77 (1980) (sovereignty rationale of personal 
jurisdiction inconsistent with due process analysis focused on fairness to defendant); Martin 
H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 
75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981) (same); Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Person-
al Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 842–44 (1995) (reading Shaffer as undermining 
any assertion of jurisdiction premised solely on state power and suggesting that exercise of 
“status” or in rem-like jurisdiction over divorce is unconstitutional if defendant lacks suffi-
cient minimum contacts with forum state); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 52, at 748, 
752–55 (due process implications of tag jurisdiction are “an unresolved question” and appli-
cation of Shaffer is “not at all clear”). Nearly twenty years prior to Shaffer, the Harvard Law 
Review staff working on a Developments in the Law project concluded that tag jurisdiction 
was inconsistent with International Shoe and likely violated due process. See Developments 
in the Law, supra note 46, at 937–40; see also supra note 73, cited in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 
205. 
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rum. Perhaps that contact need not be as weighty, sustained, or volitional as the 
contacts used to support long-arm jurisdiction. Perhaps service alone is a rea-
sonably significant contact. But after International Shoe and Shaffer, service 
alone would seem by itself not to be conclusive of the existence of personal ju-
risdiction if the jurisdictional rules are to be consistent. 
Further, Shaffer’s expression of this sentiment was nearly unanimous. No 
Justices dissented from the result (Justice Rehnquist did not participate) and 
although Justices Powell and Stevens concurred, their opinions were not incon-
sistent with a view that tag jurisdiction is subject to the fairness/reasonableness 
inquiry of International Shoe. Neither was Justice Brennan’s partial dissent re-
garding some of the majority’s reasoning nonetheless “fully agree[d] that the 
minimum-contacts analysis developed in [International Shoe] represents a far 
more sensible construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the 
patchwork of legal and factual fictions that has been generated from [Pennoy-
er].”83 
Justice Powell in fact agreed with the extension of “the principles of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington” to assertions of in rem jurisdiction, as well as 
to the Shaffer result. He wrote to “explicitly reserve judgment, however, on 
whether the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably 
and permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts 
necessary” to support exercise over personal jurisdiction and enforcement of 
any resulting judgment “to the extent of the value of the property.”84 He ob-
served that with real property in particular, there were almost inherently suffi-
cient contacts with the forum to make exercise of personal jurisdiction fair so 
long as the defendant’s liability did not exceed the value of the attached real 
property in the forum state.85 
Justice Stevens concurred, focusing on issues of notice and the degree to 
which a defendant’s contacts with the forum state might be said to give rise to 
                                                        
83  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Perhaps presaging his concurrence in 
Burnham, Justice Brennan expressed a very broad view of what constituted sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the forum to satisfy the fairness/reasonableness test of International 
Shoe. In his view, purchase of stock in a Delaware-chartered company was a sufficient con-
tact with the forum state in view of the benefits derived from such ownership such as in-
vestment income and application of forum law to corporate governance disputes, often en-
forced by forum state courts. See id. at 222–28. In light of the attractiveness of Delaware as a 
situs for incorporation, his position is defensible, albeit beyond most understandings of suffi-
cient contact with a forum state. Justice Brennan also objected to the majority opinion as de-
ciding more than was necessary to resolve the case and hence constituting an impermissible 
advisory opinion. See id. at 220–21. Importantly, however, Justice Brennan was completely 
in accord with the view that tag transient jurisdiction must be assessed according to a mini-
mum contacts standard. Although Justice Brennan frequently took a charitable view of what 
constituted sufficient minimum contacts, one can also reasonably posit that even these broad 
notions of sufficient fairness and reasonableness would not support effective tag jurisdiction 
over persons stopping for gas, changing planes or trains, or flying over a state, although his 
Burnham opinion can be read in that manner. 
84  Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring). 
85  Id. at 219. 
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“predictable risks” of being sued in the state. He found that the purchase of 
stock did not adequately apprise a purchaser of such risks.86 In an important 
passage that is sometimes misread as suggesting a continued allegiance to tag 
jurisdiction, he wrote, “I would also not read [the Court’s decision] as invali-
dating other long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with 
adequate notice of both the particular controversy and the fact that their local 
activities might subject them to suit.”87 
This passage can be hurriedly read as a view that because Shaffer involved 
only quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, Shaffer did not also invalidate in personem ju-
risdiction by service alone. But it is important to note that in this passage, Jus-
tice Stevens was emphasizing his view that for other traditional methods of ac-
quiring jurisdiction to be valid, they must both provide adequate notice and 
involve defendants who could fairly and reasonably believe that they had en-
gaged in sufficient forum state activity to be subject to suit in the forum state. 
Although this passage may indicate that Justice Stevens was amenable to tag 
jurisdiction in cases where there was also sufficient defendant contact with the 
forum, the passage also clearly suggests that he would have opposed the exer-
cise of tag jurisdiction upon defendants driving briefly on state roads, stopping 
for gas, changing planes at an airport, or flying over the state. 
C. Up in the Air: Testing the Limits of Tag Jurisdiction in the Post-
International Shoe and Post-Shaffer Era 
1. Service on the Move 
International Shoe did not address service of process and its relationship to 
what came to be known as specific personal jurisdiction. Neither did Perkins v. 
Benguet Consol. Mining,88 the Court’s leading (indeed, then the only) general 
personal jurisdiction case of the time. Judicial concern with service of process 
focused primarily upon whether the defendant was provided with adequate no-
tice of the action rather than whether service within state territory was a suffi-
cient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Even though International 
Shoe conceptualized the due process inquiry as one focusing on the relationship 
between forum contact and fairness, there appears to have been no significant 
                                                        
86  Id. at 217–19 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
One who purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be expected to know 
that he has thereby become subject to suit in a forum remote from his residence and unrelated to 
the transaction. . . . For unless the purchaser ascertains both the State of incorporation of the 
company whose shares he is buying, and also the idiosyncrasies of its law, he may be assuming 
an unknown risk of litigation. I therefore agree with the Court that on the record before us no ad-
equate basis for jurisdiction exists and that the Delaware statute is unconstitutional on its face. 
Id. (emphasis added). But in making this observation, Justice Stevens perhaps unduly glosses 
over the degree to which the defendants were not run-of-the-mill stock buyers but were of-
ficers and directors of the company. 
87  Id. at 219. 
88  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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questioning of the continuing vitality of tag jurisdiction (or quasi-in-rem juris-
diction, which was subsequently curtailed in Shaffer v. Heitner). 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,89 the Court’s most ex-
tensive discussion of the due process concerns surrounding service and notice, 
the Court did little to shed light on whether the International Shoe approach, 
which had obviously displaced Pennoyer regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
had also displaced other portions of the Pennoyer paradigm. 
In the wake of International Shoe, the legal profession focused on the as-
pects of Pennoyer that expanded jurisdiction beyond the physical boundaries of 
the forum state; however, everyone appeared to have paid relatively little atten-
tion to the aspects of International Shoe that logically called into question tradi-
tional state exercises of personal jurisdiction based on physical power that 
might not be consistent with International Shoe’s concern over fairness and 
reasonable expectation of being subject to suit in the forum state. As a result, it 
appears that lawyers continued to consider tag jurisdiction and (until Shaffer v. 
Heitner) quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as legitimate and courts did not block such 
moves. These methods for obtaining personal jurisdiction probably have been 
used much less now that International Shoe and state long-arm statutes permit-
ted rather expansive assertions of personal jurisdiction where a defendant was 
regularly conducting activity in the forum state that reasonably related to a par-
ticular lawsuit or the subject matter of the lawsuit. 
2. Grace v. MacArthur: The Trial Court Case as an Illustrative and 
Misleading Icon That Presages the Burnham Plurality Opinion 
Grace v. MacArthur is probably the most outlandish example of the exer-
cise of tag service being used to establish personal jurisdiction notwithstanding 
the new jurisdictional paradigm of fairness and reasonable expectation.90 The 
case involved a business dispute, with the plaintiff seeking specific perfor-
mance of a purported sales contract with Bankers Life and Casualty and its 
prominent head, insurance tycoon and posthumous philanthropist John D. 
MacArthur.91 As one might expect, in the post-International Shoe world, ob-
                                                        
89  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
90  Less outlandish examples such as that of Whitney v. Madden, 79 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1948) 
were probably common even if not frequently resulting in reported opinions. In Whitney, an 
Ohio resident was served on behalf of a Minnesota plaintiff asserting a defamation claim 
while the defendant was “spending the night as a guest in a Chicago hotel and while in trans-
it from one part of the United States to another.” 79 N.E.2d at 594. All judges hearing the 
case appear to have regarded the service-while-traveling as effective to establish personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant in Illinois, but these same judges also readily agreed that the 
case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. 
91  John D. MacArthur owned, controlled, and operated not only Bankers Life but a number 
of insurers and had something of a robber baron’s reputation in that during his time at the 
helm his companies were known as being a difficult employer who established a corporate 
culture of undue resistance to or slow payment of policyholder claims. See generally NANCY 
KRIPLEN, THE ECCENTRIC BILLIONAIRE: JOHN D. MACARTHUR—EMPIRE BUILDER, 
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taining long-arm jurisdiction over a large insurance company, even in relatively 
small, agrarian Arkansas, was not difficult under a theory of “doing business” 
jurisdiction92 that may no longer be viable in the wake of Goodyear and Daim-
ler, discussed below.93 Plaintiff set forth allegations of business contact be-
tween MacArthur and the forum state that were not resolved in the opinion but 
were arguably sufficient to satisfy the state long-arm statute and due process. 
But suing MacArthur’s co-defendant Ronnie Smith in Arkansas proved more of 
a challenge in that Smith apparently had no physical connection to the state and 
no financial or real estate holdings tied to the state. 
Undeterred, plaintiff Grace arranged to have defendant Smith served while 
his non-stop flight on Braniff Airlines Flight 337 from Memphis to Dallas was 
over Pine Bluff, Arkansas, in the Eastern District of Arkansas. Smith chal-
lenged the service and the court’s jurisdiction over him. The trial court (and ap-
parently counsel) appear to have explicitly accepted that transient jurisdiction 
satisfied due process. The harder question for the court was whether service on 
an airplane at twenty thousand feet was sufficiently inside Arkansas to qualify 
for tag jurisdiction.94 
In their briefs in connection with Smith’s motion[,] counsel on both sides 
state that they have been unable to find any case dealing with the specific prob-
lem in hand. The Court likewise has been unable to find such a case. Nonethe-
less, the Court is persuaded that a person moving in interstate commerce across 
the State of Arkansas in a regular commercial aircraft, flying in the regular navi-
gable airspace above the State, is within the “territorial limits” of the State and is 
amenable to service . . . .95 
                                                                                                                                
RELUCTANT PHILANTHROPIST, RELENTLESS ADVERSARY (2008). After his death, MacArthur’s 
name became more prominently associated with philanthropy, particularly the “genius” 
awards distributed by the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, a regular sponsor 
of public television programs. The awards are famous because of their size (a quarter-million 
dollars or more) and the Foundation’s secretive selection method. One cannot apply for the 
award; it just comes to those who emerge from the secretive selective process (former 
UNLV Professor David Hickey is a recipient). The recipients can use the funds for anything 
they wish and the criteria, such as it is known, is simply that the recipient have demonstrated 
great talent, hence the “genius” award name. See id. 
92  See Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (2001); Twitchell, supra note 52, at 635 (viewing exercises of 
jurisdiction based on defendant business activity in state a form of general jurisdiction but 
finding that many such cases also involve connection between the forum and the subject 
matter or other parties of the dispute). 
93  See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 171–82 and accom-
panying text. 
94  See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (“The narrow question 
for us to decide is whether for service purposes, the passengers on a commercial aircraft are 
within the territorial limits of the State over which the plane happens to be flying at a partic-
ular time.”). 
95  Id. 
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The MacArthur court based its ruling on federal aviation statutes governing 
airspace.96 Citing regulatory precedent, the trial court noted that “[t]he sover-
eign power and jurisdiction of a state is not limited to the ground”97 and “asser-
tions of [state regulatory] jurisdiction are valid where they do not conflict with 
controlling federal legislation.”98 Judge Jesse Smith Henley, the trial judge in 
MacArthur,99 focused on issues of state sovereignty and drew heavily on state-
federal division of regulatory authority and state policy power authority,100 ra-
ther than examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction based on slap service 
at twenty thousand feet comported sufficiently with standards of fair play and 
substantive justice. 
One reads MacArthur and begins to wonder whether the opinion might 
even have predated International Shoe because of the former’s relentless but 
unreflective view that in-state service alone justifies the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in the forum state.101 The opinion, issued eighty-five years after 
                                                        
96  See id. (“[I]t is clear that an aircraft flying over a State is within that State and is subject 
to its jurisdiction” for purposes of regulating air travel.). 
97  Id. (quoting State v. Nw. Airlines, 7 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. 1942) and citing other cas-
es, relying particularly on Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930), a 
leading case of the time regarding state-federal boundaries in air traffic regulation). 
98  Id. at 445 (citing Braniff Airlines v. Neb. Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 
590 (1954), which involved the scope of taxing authority among the various states where 
commerce took place). 
99  As is apparent to the reader, I am highly critical of Grace v. MacArthur and its reasoning. 
My initial trial hypothesis was that the district judge rendering the decision might simply 
have not been very good. Much to my surprise, Judge Henley (1917–1997), had a most im-
pressive resume and list of accomplishments. See Morris S. Arnold, A Tribute to Judge J. 
Smith Henley, 52 ARK. L. REV. 297 (1999). An Eisenhower appointee at a time when the 
Administration was looking for judges sufficiently independent and courageous to enforce 
Brown v. Board and Justice Department desegregation orders, Judge Henley served for more 
than fifteen years as a district judge and another seven as an Eighth Circuit judge. The feder-
al building and courthouse in Fort Smith is named after him. His strong reputation prompts 
greater mystery. How could a good judge have written such a bad opinion? Grace v. McAr-
thur was one of Judge Henley’s very first opinions, issued while he was an interim appointee 
to the Eastern District of Arkansas during several months in 1959. The Senate did not ap-
prove his nomination, which was resubmitted by the White House but for a vacancy in the 
Western District of Arkansas, where he then sat for fifteen years. It may not be all that spec-
ulative to think that a more experienced Judge Henley (and certainly one writing after Shaf-
fer v. Heitner) would not so slavishly applied tag transient jurisdiction. 
100  See MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. at 445–46. For example, the MacArthur court relied on one 
case involving seizure of contraband liquor on a flight from Canada by state authorities 
(United States v. One Pitcairn Bi-plane, 11 F. Supp. 24, 25 (W.D.N.Y. 1935)) and upon 
Commerce Clause and state riparian rights precedents. See id. 
101  The MacArthur court’s only concern seems to involve the distance of defendant’s travel 
from the ground. See id. at 447 (“It may be conceded, perhaps, that a time may come, and 
may not be far distant, when commercial aircraft will fly at altitudes so high that it would be 
unrealistic to consider them as being within the territorial limits of the United States or of 
any particular State while fling at such altitudes. But no such situation is here presented. We 
have an ordinary commercial aircraft, flying on an ordinary commercial flight in the ordinary 
navigable and navigated airspace of 1958.”). Presumably, then, the MacArthur court would 
have found service sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in any state along the route of an 
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Pennoyer, reads as though the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction had re-
mained static during all that time. “[A]t the time the Marshal served the sum-
mons on the defendant, Smith, the plane and its passengers were within the 
‘territorial limits’ of the State of Arkansas, as that term is used in [Rule 4]. 
Hence, Smith’s motion to quash will be denied.”102 
The court gives a nod to fairness concerns, but only after framing the issue 
in a most bizarre way. In what, to me, is an amazing part of the opinion, the 
court states: 
The result here reached seems to be just, equitable and practical. It cannot seri-
ously be contended that a person moving in interstate commerce is on that ac-
count exempt from service of process while in transit, and we [the royal “we” in 
that this was a single judge district court decision] think it makes no practical 
difference whether he is traveling at the time on a plane, or on a bus or train, or 
in his own car. True, if he is going by plane the duration of his presence in the 
State will probably be much shorter than if he were availing himself of some 
other means of transportation, but that is a difference of degree only, not of prin-
ciple.103 
Apart from the service-in-flight problem, the MacArthur court arguably 
erred in that the court takes as a given that service of process on state soil gives 
the state in personam jurisdiction over the defendant (over any matter, not just 
those related to defendant contacts with the forum state), even in situations 
such as the defendant briefly stepping over a state line once in his life to pur-
chase an ice cream cone. So long as the brief sojourn for ice cream was volun-
tary and not procured by fraud, a state in which the defendant has spent perhaps 
ninety seconds can be sued over disputes relating not only to the ice cream cone 
but to disputes that any prospective plaintiff may have with the defendant (pro-
vided that the plaintiff has a process server on hand when the ice cream “trip” 
takes place). 
Once MacArthur accepts this assumption, it is then no more unfair to serve 
the defendant while in an airplane rather than when making an isolated pur-
chase, even though both involve only unique or episodic as well as trivial con-
tact unrelated to the underlying dispute, any injury inflicted in the state, and 
any real state interest in the matter or the parties. Although this may technically 
satisfy some strained strand of formal logic, it seems inherently nonsensical and 
unfair.104 
                                                                                                                                
airline flight. Thus, on a typical Boston to Los Angeles flight, a defendant who was only on 
Massachusetts or California soil could, depending on the flight path of the airplane, be 
sued—over anything—in as many as a dozen states (New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, 
Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Nevada) that are in the po-
tential flight path even though the defendant had never had any contact with any of these 
states. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  See Brilmayer et al., supra note 52, at 753–54 (“Suppose, for example, a state adopts a 
long-arm statute predicating jurisdiction upon the defendant’s prior presence in the state at 
any time and directing notice by registered mail. This statute probably would violate due 
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To be sure, the most absurd aspects of such situations can be mitigated by 
motions to dismiss due to improper venue,105 to transfer to a more convenient 
venue (where the transferee court is within the federal system),106 or by a mo-
tion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds (where a possible alternative 
court with proper venue or better venue lies within another judicial system).107 
But even if instances of truly absurd unfairness can be avoided through use of 
these other doctrines, the defendant trapped by tag service is, unless permitted 
to argue International Shoe fairness as a basis for Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal, sub-
jected to the risk of deprivation of property by a forum with essentially no con-
nection to the defendant. At a minimum, the defendant is burdened by the sig-
nificant imposition of being forced to fight this subjugation on venue grounds, 
an area where courts have wider discretion than in matters of personal jurisdic-
tion.108 Further, if such a case miraculously stays in the forum state of tag juris-
diction, the presiding court will have vast discretion regarding choice of appli-
cable law.109 
In short, Grace v. MacArthur seems like a bizarre hypothetical dreamed up 
by a faculty member to torment first-year students; nevertheless, it actually held 
that merely getting on a plane in Memphis (with a process server lurking on the 
flight) could subject a defendant to suit in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. With this con-
clusion, the court used reasoning that would support the exercise of general 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Alaska, Hawaii, or anywhere in the 
United States, had the flight been sufficiently long. In reaching this astonishing 
result, the district court applied only the mechanical, territorial thinking of 
Pennoyer and essentially ignored the fairness and reasonableness due process 
analysis of International Shoe. 
                                                                                                                                
process, but its underlying notice rationale differs little from that for transient jurisdiction.”); 
Developments in the Law, supra note 46, at 939 (“To assert jurisdiction on the basis of a 
brief physical appearance within a state, however,—perhaps during an airplane flight across 
its territory—seems totally inconsistent with an analysis of the relevant interests and appears 
to impose unjustifiable hardship on the defendant.”). 
105  See 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012). 
106  See id. § 1404. 
107  Forum non conveniens dismissal is well established in the federal system. See Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). It is 
also available in most states. See, e.g., Whitney v. Madden, 79 N.E.2d 593, 595–96 (Ill. 
1948) (tag service conferred personal jurisdiction but case dismissed on forum non conven-
iens grounds). 
108  See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (even where venue is proper, court may transfer action to another 
court where venue is more convenient); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 3.13–3.16. 
109  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981); see also Rush v. 
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328–29 (1979) (striking down state’s attempt to assert in rem juris-
diction over insurance policy) (another case suggesting due process limits on personal juris-
diction that is in tension with MacArthur and the Scalia opinion in Burnham). Regarding the 
malleability of choice of law analysis and the Supreme Court’s reluctance to police lower 
court exercises of discretion, see Thomas O. Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 12 NEV. L.J. 600 (2012). 
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Although exerting authority over defendant Smith, the trial court reserved 
decision on defendant MacArthur’s motion to quash (which was apparently 
made without an alternative motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
The ground was that a separate examination of the Arkansas long-arm statute 
and MacArthur’s contacts with the jurisdiction were in order and that further 
abstention might be required until the issue of Smith’s status as a purported 
agent of MacArthur was resolved.110 There are no further reported decisions in 
the case, which presumably settled, so there is no record of any resolution of 
the personal jurisdiction question surrounding defendant MacArthur. 
3. The Odd Treatment of Grace v. MacArthur as Authoritative 
In light of its problematic holding and reasoning, one might have expected 
Grace v. McArthur to have faded into relative obscurity. Instead, it escaped that 
fate and became something of a poster child of resistance to the logical conse-
quences of the new fairness/reasonableness approach of International Shoe. In 
fact, as discussed below, it provided support for Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Burnham, even if MacArthur was not cited. MacArthur also subsequently pro-
vided support for the mythology of Burnham (that the Scalia opinion represents 
the definitive “law” regarding transient jurisdiction). 
Grace v. MacArthur was not only memorable on its facts, but also became 
enshrined as an illustration of the continued availability of tag jurisdiction. Al-
though only cited in ten subsequent judicial decisions during the ensuing sixty-
five years, the subsequent cases all largely embraced the reasoning of the deci-
sion.111 For example, in Moore v. Lindsay, a trial court (writing only a year be-
fore Burnham) denied a Rule 12(b)(2) motion by a defendant “personally 
served with the summons in this case when she was visiting friends or relatives 
in Danville, Virginia.”112 The claim was based on the defendant having fur-
nished an allegedly defective ladder to a workman performing repairs at de-
fendant’s Oregon home.113 Defendant Bonnie Lindsey, who had been served 
while on the Virginia trip (her husband had not been served and his motion to 
dismiss was consequently granted by the trial court),114 argued that being sued 
in Virginia, a state in which she did no business and owned no property, violat-
                                                        
110  See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447–48 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
111  See, e.g., Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748, 755–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (although law of per-
sonal jurisdiction has changed since Pennoyer, “[p]resence within a state, even temporary or 
transitory presence, is still a common law basis instilling competence in the courts of that 
state to adjudicate claims against a person”) (citing MacArthur and Mullane v. Cent. Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); see also id. at 756 (citing Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) for the proposition that domicile is sufficient for assertion of 
personal jurisdiction even if domiciliary not in forum state at time of lawsuit or activity giv-
ing rise to lawsuit). 
112  Moore v. Lindsay, No. 89-0008-D, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 
7, 1989). 
113  Id. at *1. 
114  Id. at *6–7. 
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ed her due process rights when the lawsuit had no connection to her visit to 
Virginia.115 
The Moore v. Lindsay trial court, although appreciating defendant’s argu-
ment based on International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner, was unsympathetic 
but addressed the issue at length in an arguably deeper and more nuanced man-
ner than would the Burnham Court a year later. 
The apparently sweeping language of Shaffer has caused several commen-
tators to speculate that the Supreme Court had brushed aside the old cases such 
as [Pennoyer], that had approved jurisdiction based simply on the defendant’s 
“presence” in the forum, no matter how brief. Some courts in the past had car-
ried the notion of presence quite far, to the extent of approving personal service 
of the defendant on an airplane flying over the forum state. Since Shaffer, a few 
courts have decided that personal service on a defendant who is only a transient 
in the forum state may not be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Sever-
al other courts have held, however, that a defendant’s transient presence in the 
forum state is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 
In light of the general modern trend to expand the possible bases of courts’ 
jurisdiction, I believe the better-reasoned decisions are those upholding transient 
presence as a basis for jurisdiction. . . . 
I do not believe that the Supreme Court intended in Shaffer v. Heitner to 
sweep away the most traditional basis for a court’s exercise of jurisdiction: the 
defendant’s presence in the forum state. . . . 
. . . . 
In the case before me, the defendant Bonnie Lindsay voluntarily came into 
the forum state, Virginia. Since a previous action against her had been dismissed 
because the plaintiff had not properly served the defendants, Lindsay was prob-
ably aware that she was in danger of being served with process. Once Lindsay 
physically entered Virginia, she took the risk that the state would exercise its 
power over her person or her property. [Therefore,] personal service on Bonnie 
Lindsay while she was in Virginia is a sufficient basis for this Court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over her.116 
                                                        
115  Id. at *1–2. 
116  Id. at *3–6 (citations omitted). Compare Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of U.S.A., 765 
F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985) (service on transient defendant alone not enough to establish personal 
jurisdiction); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 
1986) (same) with Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326, 
328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (service within forum confers personal jurisdiction over served de-
fendant for all matters); Lockert v. Breedlove, 361 S.E.2d 581, 585 (N.C. 1987) (same); 
Cariaga v. Dist. Court, 762 P.2d 886, 887 (Nev. 1988) (same); Nutri-W. v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 
693, 695–96 (Wyo. 1988) (same). Moore v. Lindsay also approvingly quoted Amusement 
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985) for the view that “[i]f there is any-
thing that characterizes sovereignty, it is the state’s dominion over its territory and those 
within it.” 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *5–6. As the Lindsay court also noted, Mordelt 
found that “there was a sufficient basis for a Louisiana court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a 
West German company when the company’s general manager was personally served while 
attending a New Orleans trade show.” Id. at *5. What the Lindsay court appeared not to ap-
preciate was that service on a mere agent of a corporation is generally not enough, standing 
alone, to subject the corporate entity to personal jurisdiction in the forum state but that the 
agent’s attendance at the trade show may have been (at the time the Mordelt Court rendered 
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In addition to service of process as an anti-tourism argument for Virginia 
(and every other state in the Union), Moore v. Lindsay engages in selective 
reading of both International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner. The Lindsay Court 
cleaved to the portion of International Shoe that supported extensive extra-
territorial jurisdiction based on a nonresident defendant’s volitional contacts 
with the state related to the dispute; however, it essentially shrugged off the 
equally or more important portion of International Shoe that emphasized fair-
ness and reasonableness rather than territoriality and physical power alone. 
Similarly, the Lindsay Court’s reading of Shaffer v. Heitner focused not on 
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion, but rather the concurrence of Justice Ste-
vens, which cautioned that Shaffer should not be construed “as invalidating 
other long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with ade-
quate notice of both the particular controversy and the fact that their local activ-
ities might subject them to suit.”117 Despite agreeing with the majority that 
Delaware’s assertion of quasi-in-rem personal jurisdiction based upon a nonres-
ident’s ownership of stock in a Delaware-chartered corporation violated due 
process, Justice Stevens added: 
The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a 
particular activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. 
If I visit another State, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I 
knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my prop-
erty or my person while there. My contact with the State, though minimal, gives 
rise to predictable risks.118 
The Stevens concurrence is hardly an endorsement of broad tag jurisdic-
tion. Most obviously, Justice Stevens is writing for himself and was not a vote 
necessary to the majority holding. Like Justice Powell, who also wrote a solo 
concurrence, Justice Stevens expresses an important view that bespeaks some 
caution before rejecting tag jurisdiction; however, this is a far cry from the 
Shaffer Court as a whole reaffirming tag jurisdiction when it has become so in-
consistent with the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as a whole. A 
more reasonable reading of the Stevens concurrence is that even a brief visitor 
may be stopped by police or required to pay tolls, but it hardly follows that the 
state one is temporarily visiting can “exercise its power” over the visitor to ad-
judicate claims against the visitor that have nothing to do with the state. 
Perhaps most disturbing about Moore v. Lindsay and other modern cases 
supporting tag jurisdiction (including the various opinions in Burnham dis-
                                                                                                                                
its decision) sufficient business in the forum state or may have been sufficiently related to 
the underlying law suit to satisfy the minimum contacts test. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding in 5–4 decision that English manufacturer had in-
sufficient contact with New Jersey to satisfy due process despite defendant’s attendance at 
trade show in Las Vegas and contact with other U.S. States). 
117  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in Lindsay, 1989 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *6. 
118  Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in Lindsay, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at 
*5. 
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cussed below) is that there is no serious effort to compare the functional differ-
ences between tag jurisdiction and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Such a compari-
son, if done fairly and logically, leads inexorably to the conclusion that if qua-
si-in-rem jurisdiction is only valid upon passing a minimum contacts fair-
fairness/reasonableness analysis, the same must be true of tag jurisdiction. 
Under a regime of tag jurisdiction, a once-in-a-lifetime, two-second step 
over a state border can (if a process server is hovering about) subject the de-
fendant to general personal jurisdiction far beyond anything imposed on even 
the largest, wealthiest corporations. By contrast, even the most aggressive use 
of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction subjects the defendant to a lawsuit only in a state in 
which the defendant has some property, with the defendant’s financial exposure 
limited only to the value of the property. Further, owning property in a state 
seems inherently to constitute a closer connection to the forum than merely 
passing through (much less over state airspace). 
If asked to choose between the two regimes, any sane defendant would pre-
fer the more limited risks posed by quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to the vast risk 
posed by tag jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the Court realized that the inexorable logic 
of International Shoe required that its fairness/reasonableness analysis be ap-
plied to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction notwithstanding its historical pedigree and the 
general deference given to state territorial boundaries and state hegemony with-
in those boundaries. But somehow Moore v. Lindsay and similar post-Shaffer 
cases failed to implement the logic of Shaffer to tag jurisdiction, instead con-
tinuing to treat Grace v. MacArthur as authoritative.119 
After Burnham, MacArthur was less cited, undoubtedly because propo-
nents of tag jurisdiction now could use the Scalia plurality in Burnham. Never-
theless, MacArthur was still occasionally used to provide further support for the 
view that Justice Scalia’s ringing endorsement of service of process as a means 
                                                        
119  See, e.g., Mordelt, 779 F.2d at 265 (5th Cir. 1985) (service within forum confers personal 
jurisdiction over served defendant for all matters, citing MacArthur). Mordelt was cited in 
eighteen subsequent cases (including Burnham) and in thirty-four law review articles or 
notes. Accord Certain British Underwriters at Lloyds v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 789 F.2d 
1534, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fanello, 662 F.2d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Colo. 1982); McReynolds v. 
Mun. Court of Ottumwa, 207 N.W.2d 792, 799 (Iowa 1973); Marsh v. State, 620 P.2d 878, 
879 (N.M. 1980); State v. Marsh, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 824 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1980) 
(cases approving use of tag jurisdiction and citing MacArthur); see also Opert v. Schmid, 
535 F. Supp. 591, 593–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (service within forum confers personal jurisdic-
tion over served defendant for all matters) (citing other cases but not citing MacArthur); 
Aluminal Indus., Inc., 89 F.R.D. at 329 (same); Cariaga, 762 P.2d at 887 (same); Nutri-West, 
764 P.2d at 695–96 (same); Lockert, 361 S.E.2d at 585 (same); Hutto v. Plagens, 330 S.E.2d 
341, 342 (Ga. 1985) (same); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 497 N.E.2d 818, 819–20 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1986) (same). But see Nehemiah, 765 F.2d at 47 (service on transient defendant alone not 
enough to establish personal jurisdiction); Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711, 714 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (same); Harold M. Pitman Co., 626 F. Supp. at 312 (same); Mohler v. Dorado 
Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 404, 405–06 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (same). 
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of conferring personal jurisdiction constituted black letter law, notwithstanding 
International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner.120 
The rationale behind the cases finding International Shoe not to have abol-
ished tag jurisdiction was the portion of Chief Justice Stone’s decision in which 
he wrote: 
[T]he capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or 
other form of notice, [and now] due process requires only that in order to subject 
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”121 
By first focusing on the italicized language, courts wishing to retain broad 
tag jurisdiction then argued that where defendants were within the forum state 
at the time of service, such defendants remained subject to the traditional terri-
torial power declared in Pennoyer. While such a reading is plausible (even if 
erroneously assuming that Justice Stone was envisioning brief, episodic, acci-
dental presence in the forum unrelated to the litigation rather than substantial or 
long-standing presence in the forum), it became increasingly hard to justify af-
ter Shaffer v. Heitner. But the view remained entrenched, with MacArthur 
available both to cite as support and to use as an illustration of the outer limit of 
tag jurisdiction. If such assertions of jurisdiction could take place in mid-air, 
similar assertions on the ground looked less unreasonable.122 
Perhaps more significant has been the reception of Grace v. MacArthur in 
secondary literature. It has been cited in seventy legal periodicals. Although 
many of these citations are in articles spurred by Burnham rather than MacAr-
thur or the topic of transient jurisdiction per se, and several are critical of Mac-
Arthur’s broad notion of transient jurisdiction, all appear to treat the decision as 
setting forth a correct statement of the law and the continuing vitality of transi-
ent jurisdiction. 
Perhaps more important, MacArthur became a near-staple note case con-
tained in civil procedure casebooks and treatises to illustrate the continued 
availability of tag jurisdiction. Casebooks often contain reference to Grace v. 
MacArthur, usually treating the case as a correct application of the law, albeit 
with unusual facts.123 Similarly, major treatises cite MacArthur with approval 
as correctly reflecting the law.124 
                                                        
120  See, e.g., Evello Invs., N.V. v. Printed Media Servs., 158 F.R.D. 172, 173 (D. Kan. 
1994). 
121  See, e.g., Lockert, 361 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945) and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (italics to International 
Shoe quotation added by the Lockert court). 
122  For example, service on the defendant in Aluminal Indus., Inc., 89 F.R.D. at 329 oc-
curred during the defendant’s brief stopover at an airport in the jurisdiction. 
123  See, e.g., CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 55; SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 1; but see FREER 
& PERDUE, supra note 1 (no mention of MacArthur); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1 
(same); but see MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 688 (referring to MacArthur as “[t]he reduc-
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Even casebooks that do a good job describing the nuances of Burnham125 
seem to fall prey to a disturbing tendency to accept the Grace v. MacArthur re-
sult and rationale. One recent textbook presents the following illustration and 
assessment: 
Suppose [a] defendant is returning to his home in Oregon from a trip to 
Hawaii. As it approaches Oregon, his airplane passes through northern Califor-
nia, at which point an authorized process-server sitting next to him on the plane 
serves him with process—while in the airspace over California. May the Cali-
fornia court assert personal jurisdiction? Was the defendant actually physically 
present while served? 
Analysis: Yes. A defendant who is within the airspace of a state is nonethe-
less actually physically present in the state for personal jurisdiction purposes.126 
This textbook, like almost all others in the field, treats pure tag-style, tran-
sient jurisdiction as alive and well.127 But as previously noted and explored in 
                                                                                                                                
tio ad absurdum” illustration of tag jurisdiction, commenting that the case “involved no ele-
ments of either convenience or submission by the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court” 
and rhetorically asking whether “there [is] any persuasive justification” for such an exercise 
of personal jurisdiction); see also STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 85–88 (treating MacAr-
thur as authoritative but questioning its continued vitality in light of Shaffer v. Heitner and 
the multiple Court opinions in Burnham). 
124  See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 168–69 (7th ed. 2004) (through use of tag 
jurisdiction “even momentary presence of defendant creates power to adjudicate a claim to-
tally unrelated to that presence”) (citing Grace v. MacArthur and summarizing it as finding 
“valid service on defendant flying over state”). One prominent treatise appears to alternate 
between (in my view) overreading Burnham, as continued endorsement of tag jurisdiction 
and recognizing its constitutional vulnerability, then back to viewing tag jurisdiction as 
nonetheless enduring because of inertia and status quo bias: 
Shaffer v. Heitner appeared to open jurisdiction based on service within the state (called tag ju-
risdiction) to constitutional challenge: why should a defendant’s brief presence within a state 
warrant the assertion of jurisdiction on an entirely unrelated claim? However, the Court rejected 
such a challenge in Burnham . . . . Four Justices found the history of in-state service sufficient to 
support its constitutionality, apparently in all cases, and three were willing to construe out of ex-
istence Shaffer’s statements that all assertions of state court jurisdiction are subject to Interna-
tional Shoe standards. Four other Justices said only that service on a defendant voluntarily pre-
sent in a state “as a rule” supports jurisdiction, while the ninth Justice committed himself to no 
general rule. It may be, therefore, that [based on the rationale of Shaffer] service based on per-
sonal service will yet be held unconstitutional in extreme cases, such as when the defendant is 
served while flying across a state. But don’t hold your breath. 
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 30, § 3.6 at 124 (footnotes omitted). 
125  See STEMPEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 85–88 describing discussion of Burnham. In that 
textbook, from which the ensuing citation of Grace v. MacArthur is derived, the book also 
alerts the student: “In Burham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), however, a majority 
of the Supreme Court left open the possibility that the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
based solely on fleeting presence might be so unfair in some circumstances as to raise consti-
tutional concerns.” See id. at 87. 
126  Id. at 88 (citing Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) as an example). 
127  See id. at 86–87. One example used in the textbook is of a dancer in a studio on the Cali-
fornia-Oregon border who is served while standing partially on the California side of the 
dance studio. According to this textbook, the service is effective because “[a] state generally 
may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is actually physically present in the 
state as long as the defendant is present while served with process.” Id. at 87. But see id. at 
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more detail below regarding Burnham, this strong view of tag jurisdiction had 
the support of only four Justices. There was also the de facto opposition of five 
members of the Court, or at least the implicit requirement that there be some 
additional defendant contact with the forum state. 
Of course, not all the blame for the continued judicial allegiance to tag ju-
risdiction can be placed upon MacArthur. For example, in a decision issued 
nearly twenty years after MacArthur and less than a year before Shaffer v. 
Heitner, the First Circuit stated without hesitation, “It has long been black letter 
law that personal service within its geographical area establishes a court’s per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant.”128 In that case, defendant Davis and an-
other resident of Vermont were each sued over an alleged contract breach, with 
Davis served while “in New Hampshire, concededly on business unconnected 
with the partnership [giving rise to the dispute].”129 The trial court granted the 
Rule 12(b)(2) motions of both defendants, finding insufficient contact with 
New Hampshire. A First Circuit panel unanimously reversed. 
Perhaps the appeals court was, as a practical matter, unmoved by the 
“plight” of a Vermont defendant having to suffer the “inconvenience” of de-
fending a claim in New Hampshire brought by a company with whom the de-
fendant concededly had business ties.130 But the First Circuit did not expressly 
use such practical concerns in making its decision. In fact, the court appeared to 
reject any role for fairness and reasonableness analysis in assessing transient 
service. It also read International Shoe as a one-way street for plaintiffs seeking 
expansive jurisdiction. 
The cases relied upon by defendant discussing “fairness,” etc., alleging contra, 
are directed either to the fairness of the basis for substituted service when an in-
dividual was not personally served or present within the area, or to the fairness 
of subjecting a foreign intangible entity, such as a corporation, to the jurisdiction 
of the court. The concern, in other words, was with expanding jurisdiction be-
yond traditional limits, not with contracting it.131 
The First Circuit was dismissive of what, forty years later, still looks like a 
persuasive argument against the slavish embrace of tag jurisdiction and some 
symmetry of treatment between individual defendants and entity defendants.132 
The Davis court continued, 
                                                                                                                                
85–88 (noting that this same textbook points out that Burnham does not necessarily support 
either the Grace v. MacArthur result or the interstate dance floor hypothetical). 
128  Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1969)). 
129  Id. at 419. 
130  Cf. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1976) (striking down New Hamp-
shire’s requirement that bar admission applicants be state residents, noting that applicant 
Piper, a Vermont resident, lived only 400 yards from the New Hampshire border). 
131  Donald Manter Co., 543 F.2d at 420 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 
F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970)). 
132  Commenting on the trial court’s dismissal, the First Circuit stated: 
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Nor will we adopt the suggestion, advanced by some commentators, but unsup-
ported by any judicial authority, that an individual’s mere presence within the 
jurisdiction is not enough to subject him to the court’s process. As to this, we 
consider it particularly unacceptable to say that an action not in rem must be 
brought in the defendant’s residence to the exclusion of the plaintiff’s. Rather, 
even on the limited subject of venue, it is frequently said that, at least in the ab-
sence of a showing of harassment, the party who brings the suit should be the 
one to choose the forum.133 
The First Circuit’s approach arguably presaged the Scalia approach in 
Burnham in that it is both hidebound regarding perceived tradition and a bit se-
lective in its use of source materials. For example, the full text of Section 28 of 
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws states that tag jurisdiction (as of 
1969, prior to Shaffer v. Heitner) was valid unless the exercise of jurisdiction 
would be unfair to the defendant.134 For reasons never explained, the panel fails 
to quote the Restatement accurately and to grapple with its meaning. The appel-
late court’s one nod to fairness (and it may in practice be a significant one) was 
to note the ready availability of venue transfer in apt cases.135 
II. BURNHAM 
Thus, as of the later twentieth century, the judicial revolution in personal 
jurisdiction was incomplete. Minimum contacts analysis displaced territoriality 
as the primary concern in exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants in matters related to the substance of the litigation. Also, a modified 
                                                                                                                                
It is not clear from the district court’s opinion which of these principles it relied on as mak-
ing the black letter law [that service within the forum state is conclusive as to personal jurisdic-
tion] outmoded. At one point it stated that an individual personally served within the jurisdiction 
is entitled to the same “fairness” treatment that would be accorded a foreign corporation not do-
ing business within the state. At another point it spoke as if partnerships were legal entities, and 
thus subject to the corporation test. Neither position is correct. 
Id. at 420. The appellate panel then went on to note that partnerships and corporations are 
treated differently under the law regarding amenability to suit. But it is hard to see how any 
error by the district court in this regard made its fairness analysis infirm. Corporations—
unlike individuals who receive less judicial protection in this regard—cannot be sued by ser-
vice within the jurisdiction upon even high-ranking corporate officials unless they are specif-
ically designated as agents for purposes of receiving service. 
133  Id. (citations omitted). In addition to citing inconvenient venue precedent (Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) and Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 
1970)), the panel cited Albert Ehrenzweig’s famous article and an almost equally prominent 
project examining jurisdiction. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 40, at 289; Developments in the 
Law, supra note 46, at 937–39. It is a bit harsh for the First Circuit to argue that the sugges-
tion of subjecting tag jurisdiction to the fairness/reasonableness prong of minimum contacts 
analysis is “unsupported by any judicial authority” given International Shoe, which is easily 
susceptible to such a reading. The Court’s Shaffer v. Heitner decision a year later, of course, 
is also substantial judicial authority that has not been overturned by Burnham. 
134  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1969). 
135  Donald Manter Co., 543 F.2d at 420 (“Any legitimate showing a defendant may make as 
to fairness in this regard is fully cognizable under the change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), without impinging on an established principle of jurisdiction. Dismissing the ac-
tion altogether is overkill.”). 
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form of minimum contacts became the touchstone for exercises of general per-
sonal jurisdiction as well. Along with this shift came a recognition that in rem 
and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction must also be assessed by the yardstick of due pro-
cess. Except for issues of siting the location of intangible property, in rem ju-
risdiction almost tautologically met the test in that if property is in the forum 
state, there is logically sufficient contact to permit the forum state to adjudicate 
matters concerning the property (but not all legal rights affecting those interest-
ed in the property). 
As the Court declared in Shaffer v. Heitner, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, in 
which the property is not at issue save as a means of notifying and subjecting 
the defendant to state power, logically must satisfy the fairness/reasonableness 
inquiry demanded by International Shoe. Many commentators had also largely 
recognized that tag jurisdiction was similarly logically subject to minimum 
contacts analysis,136 as had some courts,137 although most courts had failed to 
examine the issue or had affirmed the vitality of tag jurisdiction since it had not 
been expressly forbidden in Shaffer.138 This discrepancy set the stage for a clar-
ifying pronouncement by the Supreme Court. Instead, it delivered a fragmented 
opinion that has frequently been misunderstood and, at least as widely con-
strued, undermined the due process analysis of personal jurisdiction. 
Dennis and Francie Burnham married in 1976 in West Virginia and moved 
to New Jersey in 1977, where their two children were born. The couple sepa-
rated in July 1987 and agreed that Francie would have custody of the children 
and could move with them to California.139 They had apparently agreed that 
Francie would file for divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. How-
                                                        
136  See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 18, 25 (1982); Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaf-
fer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 
VILL. L. REV. 38, 39–40 (1980); Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction 
After World-Wide and the Abolition of the “Gotcha” Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 743–48 
(1981); Vernon, supra note 82, at 302–03; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 2002) (leading treatise ques-
tions continued viability of transient jurisdiction after Shaffer). 
137  See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46–47 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(Shaffer v. Heitner “signaled [judicial] reexamination of some of the traditional underpin-
nings of jurisdiction. . . . If the mere presence of property cannot support quasi in rem juris-
diction, it is difficult to find a basis in logic and fairness to conclude that the more fleeting 
physical presence of a non-resident person can support personal jurisdiction.”); Harold M. 
Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 311–13 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[U]nder 
Shaffer, mere service of process upon a defendant transiently present in the jurisdiction does 
not vest a state with personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”); see also id. at 312: “Personal 
service within the jurisdiction is not the litmus test for proper in personam jurisdiction. Ra-
ther, the test is whether the defendant has had minimum contacts with the forum ‘such that 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.’ ” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
138  See supra notes 111–35, citing cases affirming tag jurisdiction notwithstanding argu-
ments that basing personal jurisdiction on service in the forum state alone violates Interna-
tional Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner. 
139  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990). 
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ever, in October 1987, Dennis filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of 
desertion. Francie objected to this new tactic by Dennis and sued for divorce in 
California state court in early 1988.140 Later that month, Dennis visited south-
ern California on business. He then visited his children in the San Francisco ar-
ea, where Francie now resided, taking the older child into the city for the week-
end. When he returned the child to Francie’s home, Dennis was served with a 
California court summons and divorce petition.141 
Notwithstanding the couple’s earlier agreement about Francie and the chil-
dren moving to California, Dennis objected to divorce in California and moved 
to have the case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. His contacts with 
California consisted of several short business trips and trips to see his chil-
dren.142 The California trial court denied his motion, and the state Court of Ap-
peals denied his petition for mandamus relief, ruling that because Dennis was 
personally served in the state, he was subject to its jurisdiction.143 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the question of whether a state court could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the sole basis of in-state service of 
process alone. 
In an opinion announcing the Court’s holding, Justice Scalia (joined by 
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy) issued an opinion taking the view that pure 
territorial exercise of transient jurisdiction had indeed survived both Interna-
tional Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner. 
Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in 
American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents who are physically present in the State. The view developed early that 
each State had the power to hale before its courts any individual who could be 
found within its borders, and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a 
person by properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction 
to enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.144 
*   *   * 
This American jurisdictional practice is, moreover, not merely old; it is 
continuing. It remains the practice . . . as far as we are aware [of] all the States 
and the Federal Government—if one disregards (as one must for this purpose) 
the few opinions since 1978 that have erroneously said, on grounds similar to 
those that petitioner presses here, that this Court’s due process decisions render 
the practice unconstitutional. We do not know of a single state or federal statute, 
or a single judicial decision resting upon state law, that has abandoned in-state 
service as a basis of jurisdiction. Many recent cases reaffirm it.145 
                                                        
140  Id. at 607–08. 
141  Id. at 608. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 610–11. 
145  Id. at 615 (citations omitted). The Scalia opinion essentially assumes away the challenge 
to tag jurisdiction by largely taking the view that if most courts have not read Shaffer v. 
Heitner to require a due process analysis of tag jurisdiction just as for quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion, this automatically makes any such argument unpersuasive. Justice Scalia then labels the 
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Although reading Shaffer v. Heitner more narrowly than many commenta-
tors as a means of avoiding a due process inquiry about tag jurisdiction, those 
joining the Scalia opinion took an approach to due process different from that 
of Shaffer, and for that matter International Shoe. The Court “conducted no in-
dependent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state ser-
vice rule, leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are free to amend it; for 
our purposes, its validation is its pedigree, as the phrase ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice’ makes clear.”146 
Justice White joined in the Scalia opinion except as to Part III, which was 
largely a criticism of Justice Brennan and his approach to the issue, and further 
stated: 
The rule allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal ser-
vice in the forum State, without more, has been and is so widely accepted 
throughout this country that I could not possibly strike it down, either on its face 
or as applied in this case, on the ground that it denies due process of law guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court has the authority under 
the Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and declare 
them invalid, there has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general 
proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many in-
stances that it should be held violative of due process in every case. . . . Here, 
personal service in California, without more, is enough, and I agree that the 
judgment should be affirmed.147 
A critic might respond that this same reasoning, if used in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, would have counseled against invalidating quasi-in-rem jurisdiction—but 
Justice White joined the majority opinion in Shaffer without qualification. A 
critic might also wonder whether he really meant to so broadly embrace tag ju-
risdiction. For example, if Francie Burnham had moved with the kids to Neva-
da, would personal jurisdiction based only on service upon Dennis while he 
was changing planes at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas have satisfied due pro-
cess? The text of Justice White’s opinion literally supports this, but such a 
strained result is at odds with the Justice’s generally pragmatic approach and 
willingness to seek practical results even if it means some conflict with doctrine 
or precedent.148 
                                                                                                                                
argument about due process applying to all exercises of personal jurisdiction as one that 
“rests on a thorough misunderstanding of our cases.” Id. at 616. But as this article’s earlier 
discussion of Shaffer v. Heitner suggests, it is at a minimum very hard to square Shaffer with 
the continued use of tag jurisdiction that is immune from any due process review. The Scalia 
opinion read Shaffer as preserving the distinction between “physically present defendants” 
and “absent” ones, stating that “our tradition has treated the two classes of defendants quite 
differently, and it is unreasonable to read Shaffer as casually obliterating that distinction.” Id. 
at 621. Scholars criticizing Burnham questioned Justice Scalia’s reading of Shaffer and other 
due process/process precedents. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
148  See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92–94 (1982) 
(White, J., dissenting) (taking view that formal niceties regarding different status of judges 
appointed pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than Article III should not prevent 
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Even assuming Justice White was this adamant about the immunity of tag 
jurisdiction from fairness analysis, and Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy were 
as adamant as the clearly committed, almost strident Justice Scalia, this still 
makes for only four votes in support of the view that tag jurisdiction need never 
be subject to a fairness/reasonableness inquiry. Looking at the remainder of the 
Court in Burnham, it appears that this strong view of tag jurisdiction could not 
command a fifth vote. 
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
O’Connor, rejected the view that service within the forum alone established 
personal jurisdiction. 
I agree [that the Due Process Clause] generally permits a state court to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served with process while voluntarily 
present in the forum State. . . . [However,] I would undertake an “independent 
inquiry into the . . . fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule.” [citing to the 
Scalia opinion rejecting this obligation]. I therefore concur only in the judgment. 
[Further,] the approach adopted by Justice Scalia’s opinion today—reliance 
solely on historical pedigree—is foreclosed by our decisions in [International 
Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner].149 
Notwithstanding this reluctance to embrace an unquestioned deference to 
service in the forum as a basis for personal jurisdiction, the Brennan opinion 
concurred in the result. Specifically, Justice Brennan agreed that Dennis should 
be subject to California jurisdiction because his overall amount of contacts with 
the state was sufficient, particularly since visits with the children was contact 
related to the couple’s marital issues.150 
Thus, on the issue of whether service alone could support personal jurisdic-
tion, there appeared to be four votes solidly saying “yes” and four votes rather 
solidly saying “no” (but finding personal jurisdiction over Dennis nonetheless). 
                                                                                                                                
bankruptcy judges from being able to make determinations necessary to efficient administra-
tion of debtors’ estates). 
149  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628–29 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
150  Id. at 637–39. Critics of the Brennan concurrence tend to focus on this part of the opin-
ion, as did Justice Scalia in attacking the Brennan concurrence in Part III of Scalia’s own 
concurrence (the portion Justice White did not join). The critical perspective is that Justice 
Brennan strained to find sufficient minimum contacts by treating Burnham’s use of state 
roads and enjoyment of the state infrastructure of police and fire protection or medical care if 
needed. Although the critics of course have a point about the relatively light benefits of the 
forum state enjoyed by Burnham on this short visit aimed primarily at visiting his children, 
these are contacts nonetheless—and unlike merely flying above a state’s airspace—convey 
at least some benefits to a defendant. Dennis Burnham, in particular, was doing business in 
California, although apparently not a great quantity. But he likely derived economic benefit 
from his contact with California. And he was being sued over a divorce sought in California 
by a California resident and apparent domiciliary, who was raising Burnham’s kids in Cali-
fornia. Collectively, this is not a trivial set of contacts to combine with service, which should 
count as a contact even under a regime where it does automatically establish personal juris-
diction. Under the uniform, due process-centered model of personal jurisdiction suggested at 
the close of this article, these factors would logically support the Burnham Court’s result, 
even if rejecting the four-member Scalia plurality. 
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Justice Stevens wrote separately, supporting the exercise of jurisdiction but 
wishing to avoid broad pronouncements. 
[That] concern prevents me from joining either Justice Scalia’s or Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion in this case. For me, it is sufficient to note that the historical evi-
dence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness 
identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice 
White, all combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case. Accord-
ingly, I agree that the judgment [subjecting Dennis to personal jurisdiction in 
California] should be affirmed.151 
Prophetically, in a footnote to his concurrence, Justice Stevens made the 
statement set forth at the beginning of this article: “Perhaps the adage about 
hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.”152 In the af-
termath of Burnham, commentators and lower courts struggled a bit to discern 
exactly what the Court had said. Although four of nine justices were willing to 
support continued use of broad transient jurisdiction via service within the fo-
rum, it appeared that at least four and probably five justices saw this as insuffi-
cient standing alone. Nevertheless, despite the fragmentation of the Burnham 
Court, most lower courts appear to have treated Burnham as an affirmation of 
tag jurisdiction.153 
Many commentators were careful not to read Burnham too broadly and 
noted that exercise of personal jurisdiction probably would require something 
                                                        
151  Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
152  Id. at 640 n.*. 
153  See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(treating service alone as sufficient to confer jurisdiction because defendants “knew, or 
should have known, that by” going to meeting in New York, they were “risking exposure to 
personal jurisdiction” in the state (citing Burnham)); Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 
400 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (tag jurisdiction or “personal service on an indi-
vidual within the state” endures as “a valid method of acquiring personal jurisdiction over an 
individual”) (although this may also be a case where extenuating circumstances would sup-
port use of tag jurisdiction in the absence of the practical availability of another forum where 
relief can be obtained); In re Order Quashing Deposition Subpoenas, No. 1:02CV00054, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14928, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that pursuant to Burnham, 
“an individual may be subjected to liability by the exercise of so-called ‘tag’ jurisdiction far 
from home without the Due Process Clause being violated”); In re Marriage of Vailas, 939 
N.E.2d 565, 570–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (although finding Burnham not controlling because 
state long-arm statute does not reach to full extent of constitutional due process, finds that 
“the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Burnham, ‘[a]mong the most firmly established principles 
of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction 
over nonresidents who are physically present in the State’ ” (citing the Scalia opinion in 
Burnham but failing to note that it was joined by only two other Justices)); Schinkel v. Maxi-
Holding, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (similar treatment of Burn-
ham). See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.51 (3d ed. 
2014) (“In practice, however, [Burnham] makes clear that a challenge to jurisdiction based 
on due process grounds by a defendant who was personally served while physically present 
in the state will rarely, if ever, be successful” and citing post-Burnham cases are consistent 
with that view). 
Summer 2015] THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH 1243 
more than only service on a transient defendant.154 Some commentators were 
highly critical of Burnham’s failure to follow Shaffer’s lead and to bring tag 
jurisdiction firmly under the umbrella of the minimum contacts considerations 
of fairness and reasonableness.155 These same commentators were often partic-
ularly critical of the highly formalist, frozen-in-history Scalia opinion that 
treated pre-International Shoe understandings as determinative but gave short 
shrift to International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner.156 
But many commentators, and in particular law student study aids, overread 
Burnham as a ringing endorsement of tag jurisdiction by a majority of the 
Court or at least a widespread consensus to leave tag jurisdiction in place.157 
                                                        
154  Despite the judicial embrace of tag jurisdiction as unproblematic, many mainstream 
commentators have tried to advise bench and bar that the Scalia position in Burnham only 
enjoyed the support of 3–4 justices, with five arguably opposed. For example, Moore’s Fed-
eral Practice (§ 108.51) offers a nuanced reading of the decision, but one that nonetheless is 
excessively slanted toward reading Burnham as endorsing tag jurisdiction. 
In [Burnham], the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of jurisdiction based 
on personal service of process on a transient nonresident while that person is physically present 
in the state. However, the Court split 4-4 on whether jurisdiction based on service of process 
could be justified by its historical pedigree or required a minimum contacts and fairness analysis. 
Justices Stevens wrote a separate opinion, declining to agree with either side. 
16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 153 (footnotes omitted). As noted above, my view is that a 
sounder reading of the Stevens concurrence is that he is not willing to uphold jurisdiction 
(over Dennis Burnham or anyone else) based solely on service of process within the forum 
state—otherwise, he would have joined the Scalia or White opinions. There was no reason to 
write separately, even briefly, unless he was unprepared to uphold California’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in the absence of defendant’s other contacts with the forum state. See 
supra note 151 and accompanying text; see also Christine M. Daleiden, Comment, The Af-
termath of Burnham v. Superior Court: A New Rule of Transient Jurisdiction?, 32 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 989, 990–92 (1992) (reading Burnham’s multiple opinions in similar man-
ner). 
155  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990); Stanley 
E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane! A Critique of Recent Su-
preme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient Presence 
Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a Mini-
mum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Espe-
cially over International Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior 
Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675 (1991); Allan R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the 
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1991); Russell J. Weintraub, An Objec-
tive Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 611 (1991); Barbara Surtees 
Goto, Note, International Shoe Gets the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court Resurrects the 
Physical Power Theory, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 851 (1991); Paul C. Wilson, Note, A Pedigree 
for Due Process?, 56 MO. L. REV. 353 (1991). 
156  See, e.g., supra note 155. 
157  See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 29–30 (5th ed. 2011) (on the authority 
of Burnham, personal jurisdiction “may be exercised over an individual by virtue of his 
presence within the forum state . . . even if the individual is an out-of-state resident who 
comes into the forum state only briefly . . . as long as service was made on him” while in the 
forum state) (using facts of Burnham as illustrative example); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 8 (7th ed. 2013) (personal “jurisdiction based on 
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service of process on the defendant within the state . . . was reaffirmed in Burnham”); id. at 
16 (“[T]he Supreme Court concluded that such ‘transient jurisdiction’ is still a valid means 
of obtaining jurisdiction over an individual defendant, even if the defendant is in the state 
briefly or for reasons unrelated to the litigation.”) (citing Burnham and using example of es-
tablishing jurisdiction by having process server anticipate prospective defendant’s trip to 
state); LINDA S. MULLENIX, CIVIL PROCEDURE 254 (2d ed. 2014) (“The Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Shaffer v. Heitner has not modified the doctrine of transient jurisdiction. Assertions 
of transient jurisdiction . . . do not have to satisfy International Shoe minimum contacts ju-
risprudence.”) (citing Burnham and referring to “Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion” in the 
case, although discussing other opinions); Cox, supra note 155, at 518 (“Burnham is most 
glaringly wrong, however, in its primary conclusion, shared by all the Justices, that transient 
presence jurisdiction is under most circumstances constitutional.”); Goto, supra note 155, at 
887 (In Burnham, “[t]he Court’s clear message is that the physical power theory comports 
with due process—regardless of which due process analysis is applied.”); Scott D. Irwin, 
Note, Burnham v. Superior Court of California: The Final Word on Transient Personal Ju-
risdiction?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 613, 628–30 (1992) (summarizing and assessing case with al-
most no mention of White and Stevens concurrences and characterizing Burnham as having 
endorsed classic pre-International Shoe use of tag jurisdiction); Douglas A. Mays, Note, 
Burnham v. Superior Court: The Supreme Court Agrees on Transient Jurisdiction in Prac-
tice, but Not in Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1271 (1991) (similarly overbroad characterization of 
Burnham, treating divergent opinions as divided regarding analysis but not in basic support 
for tag jurisdiction). The Clermont Civil Procedure student hornbook appears to describe 
pure tag jurisdiction as good law even while suggesting some concern: 
[E]ven momentary presence of defendant creates power to adjudicate a claim totally unrelated to 
that presence. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (valid service on de-
fendant flying over state). 
Example: D, a Minnesotan driving to Maine for a vacation, stops at a gas station in 
Vermont. While waiting in line there, D assaults P, who is a businessman from Ohio. P 
sues D in an Ohio state court, managing to serve D with process when D stops for the 
night in Ohio on a later trip to New York. (Result: such “transient jurisdiction” is con-
stitutional.) 
Burnham . . . seems to suggest that transient jurisdiction merely by its historical pedigree 
satisfies any reasonableness test. (Despite former attempts fictitiously to apply the “presence” 
concept to corporations, the view today is that this basis meaningfully refers only to jurisdiction 
over individuals, since only individuals can be physically present.) 
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 171 (9th ed. 2012); see also Deborah  
Maranville, Sample Gold Standard Brief, Burnham v. Superior Court, available at 
http://courses.washington.edu/civpro04/BurnhamGoldStdBrief.doc (law professor’s sample 
exemplary case brief for students studying civil procedure describes Burnham as a case hold-
ing that it does not violate due process for a court to “assume personal jurisdiction over a 
[nonresident, non-domiciliary] defendant based on his physical presence in the State” even 
where the suit is “unrelated” to his activities in the state (although this summary arguably 
becomes a bit more nuanced in that it notes that the defendant was in the state for business 
and to visit with children rather than merely passing through)). But see SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 113–15 (3d ed. 2012) (reading Burnham as maintaining vi-
ability of tag jurisdiction but criticizing case as jurisprudential step backwards): 
[In Burnham], the Court could have, and arguably should have, applied the Asahi due process 
balancing test to determine whether burdens outweighed interests or vice versa. . . . The case 
would have been difficult under the Asahi balancing test, but the balance likely would have 
tipped in favor of jurisdiction, on the ground that the state’s interest in providing for the best in-
terests of the children trumped all other considerations. But this was not the basis for decision. 
None of the Justices faithfully applied the balancing test set out in Asahi; they instead turned to 
formalistic analyses reminiscent either of the 1877 Pennoyer ruling that in-state service alone 
sufficed for a state to assert jurisdiction, or of Burger King’s mechanical application of the min-
imum contacts test. 
The court fractured and there was no controlling opinion. [Going on to describe differing 
opinions in some detail]. 
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Although it is hardly the greatest problem in modern jurisprudence or legal 
education, the ravages of reading Burnham as a broad endorsement of “pure” 
tag jurisdiction unaccompanied by any other defendant contact with the forum 
state are readily apparent at final exam time. Students routinely treat Burnham 
(at least at the three law schools where I have taught) as standing for the propo-
sition that service in the forum alone without question confers personal juris-
diction over the defendant. They do this even in the total absence of any other 
connection to the forum state, which is a position that has yet to garner the sup-
port of five or more Supreme Court Justices in the post-International Shoe era. 
Because so many tag jurisdiction cases also involve other defendant con-
tacts with the forum state, lower courts were still normally able to make defen-
sible and probably correct decisions exercising jurisdiction where service with-
in the state was a key component. Outside of “poster child” cases of highly 
strained applications of tag jurisdiction, such as MacArthur, most exercises of 
tag jurisdiction would perhaps also satisfy a reasonable minimum contacts 
analysis. Nonetheless, the mere availability of pure tag jurisdiction stands in 
stark contrast to the regime of due process and fairness analysis that has other-
wise dominated personal jurisdiction analysis for decades. 
III. GOODYEAR, NICASTRO, DAIMLER, AND WALDEN V. FIORE 
For twenty years after Burnham, the Supreme Court had a relatively heavy 
docket of personal jurisdiction cases during the 1977–1990 time period, but de-
cided no significant personal jurisdiction cases. Due to misreading by lawyers, 
judges, and commentators (particularly study aid outlines), Burnham became 
known as the case that presented tag jurisdiction as “the law.” Although the 
truth was far more complicated and the decision widely disliked by academics, 
Burnham came to stand for the continuing solvency of transient jurisdiction. As 
such, it appeared to have avoided the fate of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which 
fell into relative disuse after Shaffer v. Heitner. When the Court returned to de-
ciding personal jurisdiction cases, it did so in a manner that made the always 
troublesome prevailing view of Burnham even less defensible. 
In 2011, personal jurisdiction returned with a vengeance, as the Court de-
cided two prominent personal jurisdiction cases, one involving general jurisdic-
tion and the other specific jurisdiction. Both decisions slanted in favor of re-
strictive jurisdiction. In doing so, they further undercut the argument that tag 
jurisdiction was so exceptional that it should be beyond the reach of the due 
process minimum contacts analysis governing the rest of the personal jurisdic-
                                                                                                                                
After decades of developing a modern due process analysis for the problems of a mobile 
population, the Court’s retreat to formalism was quite troubling. Allowing tag jurisdiction to 
hold up, virtually regardless of the contacts with the forum, invites gamesmanship in litigation 
and dictates that parties exercise caution in where they travel for fear of being served in an in-
convenient or inhospitable forum. This unfortunate outcome is another example of Pennoyer’s 
inapplicability in a mobile society, which every case from International Shoe to Asahi had at-
tempted to resolve. 
Id. 
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tion world. The Court continued in this vein in 2014, issuing another restrictive 
general personal jurisdiction decision, along with a specific personal jurisdic-
tion decision that, although not particularly controversial, continued in the vein 
of refusing to expand specific jurisdiction beyond its current bounds. 
A. Goodyear 
Goodyear158 began with when a North Carolina youth soccer club took a 
European trip in 2004. As a bus was taking the group to the Paris airport for a 
flight home, a tire blew out, causing an accident that killed two thirteen-year-
old North Carolinians. Their bereaved parents, also North Carolinians, sought 
compensation in their home state courts. Named as defendants were Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., and three subsidiaries of which parent Goodyear owned 
100 percent of the stock. A Turkish subsidiary had manufactured the allegedly 
defective tire, and the other subsidiaries had been involved in the distribution of 
the tire.159 All three subsidiaries contested North Carolina’s exercise of person-
al jurisdiction over them (parent Goodyear did not) but were unsuccessful.160 
Because the bus accident, the alleged negligence in tire manufacturing, and 
the boys’ deaths all occurred outside North Carolina, plaintiff asserted general 
personal jurisdiction. Under Court precedent, general personal jurisdiction re-
quired that a defendant have sufficiently “continuous and systematic” contacts 
with the forum state to make it apt for the defendant to be sued in the state over 
any claim, regardless of where the claim arose.161 The Goodyear Court, in a 
unanimous decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, held that the three subsidiar-
ies lacked such sufficient contact with the forum state even though “tens of 
thousands” of the subsidiary’s tires (out of “tens of millions” manufactured by 
the company) “were distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA 
affiliates.” The subsidiary’s tires “were typically custom ordered to equip spe-
cialized vehicles such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse 
trailers.”162 
The Court reasoned that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction re-
quired more in the way of volitional, consistent conduct specifically directed at 
or associated with the forum state than mere sales or distribution of products. 
Noting that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile” and that “for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home,” 
                                                        
158  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
159  Id. at 2850–52. For a more detailed presentation of the facts from one of plaintiffs’ attor-
neys who emphasizes parent Goodyear’s control over the subsidiaries and their products, see 
Collyn A. Peddie, Mi Case Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction over 
Foreign Corporations After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 63 S.C. L. 
REV. 697, 699–702 (2012). 
160  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852. 
161  Id. at 2853–54. 
162  Id. at 2852. 
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the Court found it improper for North Carolina to exercise general jurisdic-
tion.163 
With its emphasis on the corporate “home,” Goodyear can be read as sug-
gesting that a company’s state of incorporation and its state of corporate head-
quarters are likely to be the only forums where there is sufficiently weighty 
continuous and systematic contact to support general jurisdiction.164 At a min-
imum, Goodyear rejected establishment of general jurisdiction merely based on 
the defendant’s participation in commerce touching upon or even directed at 
the forum state.165 
B. Nicastro 
In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,166 the Court faced the issue of 
whether an English punch press manufacturer had sufficient contact with New 
Jersey to support specific personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Nicastro, a New Jersey 
resident, lost four fingers while using a McIntyre punch press at work. Under-
standably, he sought to pursue legal relief in his convenient home state.167 
McIntyre had intentionally engaged in substantial marketing, sales, and distri-
bution efforts in the United States, but none had specifically targeted New Jer-
sey. As a result, the Court, in a 6–3 decision, ruled that New Jersey lacked per-
                                                        
163  Id. at 2853–54. 
164  Id. at 2856 (“A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not 
enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that ac-
tivity.’ ” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945))); see also 
Twitchell, supra note 52, at 667 (advocating similar approach to exercise of general jurisdic-
tion). 
165  131 S. Ct. at 2854–55. 
166  J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
167  There is no hint of any forum shopping in the case (other than that the plaintiff wanted to 
sue in his home state, hardly a nefarious goal). Although New Jersey is not considered a pro-
defendant state in terms of product liability law, neither is it considered a “judicial hellhole” 
by defendants. The term is taken from the manufacturer-supported lobby group the Ameri-
can Tort Reform Association and its sibling the American Tort Reform Foundation, which 
annually present a list of its perceived dozen worst locations to be tort defendant, labeling 
these alleged pro-plaintiff jurisdictions as “judicial hellholes.” See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, 
http://www.judicialhellholes.org (last visited May 1, 2015) (a website maintained by the 
American Tort Reform Foundation that lists jurisdictions deemed excessively favorable to 
plaintiff tort claims). Examples of “Top Six” jurisdictions are California, Louisiana, New 
York City, West Virginia, Madison & St. Clair Counties in Illinois, and South Florida. See 
AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013/2014, at 7–24 (2013), 
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf. 
Putting aside the obvious political slant of ATRA and ATRF in maintaining this list and the 
essentially misleading nature of labeling an entire state pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant (much 
variance in this regard is local based on trial judges and juries), it appears that in the roughly 
twenty years of this project that New Jersey sites have not incurred the wrath of the organi-
zation. See, e.g., id. at 47 (questioning New Jersey appellate court decision permitting law-
suit against phone texters allegedly contributing to auto accident); id. at 50 (praising New 
Jersey Supreme Court decision regarding minimum qualifications for medical expert wit-
nesses). 
1248 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1203  
sonal jurisdiction over McIntyre, even though the allegedly defective punch 
press’s journey to the Garden State was not very attenuated and appeared to be 
reasonably foreseeable.168 
Nicastro can be viewed as consistent with the Court’s pre-1990s personal 
jurisdiction cases such as Asahi Metal and World-Wide Volkswagen, which 
constricted perceived excesses of jurisdictional exercise in lower courts. Never-
theless, it is arguably a more restrictive view of specific personal jurisdiction 
and volitional commercial contacts than the “stream of commerce” and “tort 
out/harm in” approaches leading to findings of personal jurisdiction in the 
Court’s 1980s cases of Burger King v. Rudzewicz, Keeton v. Hustler, Calder v. 
Jones, and many lower court cases.169 
Much has been written about Nicastro, most of it negative,170 and Nicastro 
will not be analyzed at length here except to point out that, to the extent the 
reach of specific jurisdiction shrinks, this necessarily adds further fuel to the 
argument that tag jurisdiction based on service alone is inconsistent with per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine as a whole. How, one might ask rhetorically, can the 
current Court have such misgivings about a state’s exercise of specific jurisdic-
tion over a commercial actor seeking to sell the product that allegedly caused 
injury to a state resident, and not harbor similar misgivings about subjecting a 
nonresident defendant to jurisdiction regarding any matter on the sole basis of 
service of process while the defendant was merely passing briefly through the 
state? 
C. Daimler 
In 2014, the Court again addressed general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. 
Bauman.171 As in Goodyear, the case involved unusual facts and an arguable 
overreach by plaintiffs. This raised some question about whether the restrictive 
language in the Court’s Goodyear opinion would be applied literally to more 
modest attempts to assert general jurisdiction over a defendant with substantial 
business operations in a state other than its managerial nerve center or place of 
                                                        
168  Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785. 
169  See supra notes 7–16, 51–52, and accompanying text. See generally STEMPEL ET AL., 
LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (reviewing evolution of Supreme Court 
personal jurisdiction doctrine and cases noted in above). 
170  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of 
the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245 (2011); Robin J. Effron, Letting the 
Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867 (2012); Allan Ides, Foreward: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
341 (2012); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. 
REV. 745 (2012); Peter R. Bryce, Note, Whither Fairness? In Search of a Jurisdictional Test 
After J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2975 (2012); Kristianna L. 
Sciarra, Note, A Gap in Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Analysis of J. McIntryre Ma-
chinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 195 (2013). 
171  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
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incorporation. In tandem, Goodyear and Daimler provide defense counsel with 
powerful precedent for seeking to avoid the exercise of general personal juris-
diction over a corporation anywhere but in those two locales. 
Daimler began as a claim brought by the representatives of labor activists 
who had been tortured and killed during Argentina’s “Dirty War” from 1976–
1983. The Argentine subsidiary of Daimler, maker of the Mercedes-Benz au-
tomobile, allegedly collaborated with state security forces in these human rights 
violations. Plaintiffs sued Daimler in California, with personal jurisdiction 
“predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC 
(MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
place of business in New Jersey.”172 MBUSA is Daimler’s U.S. distributor and 
conducts substantial regular business activity in California. 
Plaintiffs asserted that Daimler was subject to California jurisdiction be-
cause of its role as parent of MBUSA due to the subsidiary’s substantial busi-
ness presence in California. Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that Daimler was 
liable to plaintiffs pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 because of its status 
as parent of the Argentine subsidiary.173 The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ ju-
risdictional contentions, but a Ninth Circuit panel, after initially affirming, sub-
sequently reversed, with rehearing en banc denied by a divided Appeals Court. 
The Ninth Circuit found the agency relationship between Daimler and its sub-
sidiaries sufficient, and it did not require plaintiffs to break through the pre-
sumptive corporate veil of the different (but related) corporate entities.174 Ordi-
narily, piercing the corporate veil requires demonstrating that Daimler 
dominated the subsidiaries sufficiently to constitute a situation in which the 
subsidiaries were alter egos of the parent company. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that general 
personal jurisdiction was not established by the substantial Mercedes-Benz 
presence in California. 
The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on its observation that 
MBUSA’s services were “important” to Daimler, as gauged by Daimler’s hypo-
thetical readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist. For-
mulated this way, the inquiry into importance stacks the deck, for it will always 
yield a pro-jurisdiction answer . . . . The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus ap-
pears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have 
an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the 
“sprawling view of general jurisdiction” we rejected in Goodyear.175 
Repeating language used in Goodyear, the Daimler Court found that the 
traditional requirement of “continuous and systematic” presence in a forum 
                                                        
172  Id. at 751. 
173  See id. at 751–52. 
174  See id. at 753. 
175  Id. at 759–60. 
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state required that the defendant be “at home” in the forum state for general ju-
risdiction to be exercised. Further, according to the Daimler Court, 
Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will 
render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there. “For an individu-
al, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s 
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corpora-
tion is fairly regarded as at home.” . . . 
[However,] Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to 
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal 
place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums. 
Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified, 
and approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corpo-
ration “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” 
[citing Plaintiffs’ brief]. That formulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.176 
The Daimler Court also stressed the importance of having clear and pre-
dictable standards for general personal jurisdiction to facilitate business plan-
ning. Further, the Court found that concerns of international comity arose when 
U.S. courts attempt to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 
Other nations, including Daimler’s home country of Germany, simply do not 
have the broad notions of long-arm personal jurisdiction prevailing in the Unit-
ed States.177 Without some significant defendant contact in the forum state re-
lated to the substantive claim, exercise of jurisdiction in a state other than the 
defendant’s corporate “home” was viewed as unfair and out of sync with pre-
vailing international standards. 
It may be that after Goodyear and Daimler, general jurisdiction is, as a 
practical matter, only available in a business’s state of incorporation and state 
of managerial headquarters. But because the issue of jurisdictional presence in 
the case was so intertwined with the agency question of whether a subsidiary’s 
activity was attributable to the Daimler parent company, it is a bit difficult to 
know the reach of Daimler. As a general rule, these two “homes” of the corpo-
ration are probably the exclusive sources of general jurisdiction. However, in 
more compelling cases, courts may be more inclined to exercise general juris-
diction. 
For example, if a patron eats a tainted Big Mac at a McDonald’s on the last 
day of a Florida vacation before returning to Ohio and then is afflicted with 
food poisoning, would Goodyear and Daimler prevent the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over the parent company (assuming that there was a non-frivolous 
                                                        
176  Id. at 760–61. 
177  Id. at 763. (“The Ninth Circuit, moreover, paid little heed to the risks to international 
comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed. Other nations do not share the unin-
hibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case. In 
the European Union, for example, a corporation may generally be sued in the nation in 
which it is ‘domiciled,’ a term defined to refer only to the location of the corporation’s ‘stat-
utory seat,’ ‘central administration,’ or ‘principal place of business.’ ”). The Court also noted 
the U.S. Government’s brief in support of Daimler on these grounds. 
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claim of parent company liability for the food poisoning) in Ohio in spite of the 
many Golden Arches one sees throughout the state? But most every hypothet-
ical one could conjure creates a colorable case for specific jurisdiction as well 
by involving some connection between the defendant, the action, and the forum 
state—or at least involving a plaintiff connected to the forum state.178 For ex-
ample, in the McDonald’s food poisoning hypothetical, the plaintiff is from 
Ohio, the consequences of the food poisoning are felt in Ohio, and a company 
that has built a national brand can reasonably expect that consumers will buy 
their products in one state but consume (and certainly digest) them in other 
states. People have been known to grab burgers on the way to the airport or at 
the airport but not eat them (or suffer from them) until in another state’s air-
space (of course, waiting this long to eat the food might give rise to a compara-
tive negligence defense). By contrast, in Daimler, the plaintiffs were Argen-
tines and one Chilean. 
Had there been a California victim of abuse by a Daimler subsidiary in 
South America (or by Daimler itself), the victim plaintiff may have been per-
mitted to use general jurisdiction based on substantial business activity to fo-
rum shop to avoid a hostile foreign jurisdiction. Similarly, if plaintiffs had sued 
Daimler in the MBUSA home states of Delaware or New Jersey, this may have 
reduced the perceived unfairness of the situation. But perhaps not. The Court 
clearly felt compelled to do some line drawing to prevent lower courts from 
permitting what it regarded as outrageous exercises of personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs invoked the court’s general or all-purpose jurisdiction. California, they 
urge, is a place where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims against it, 
wherever in the world the claims may arise. For example, as plaintiffs’ counsel 
affirmed, under [Plaintiffs’] proffered jurisdictional theory, if a Daimler-
manufactured vehicle overturned in Poland, injuring a Polish driver and passen-
ger, the injured parties could maintain a design defect suit in California. Exer-
cises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we hold, are barred by due process 
constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory authority.179 
Because of the unusual facts, foreign-centered allegations of wrongdoing, 
and agency issues posed in the case,180 it is hard to be certain of Daimler’s 
                                                        
178  For example, consider a visiting American touring a facility in Germany who is negli-
gently exposed to carcinogenic chemicals during the process. After returning to his home 
state (a home state other than Delaware, where the defendant was incorporated or New Jer-
sey, where the defendant was headquartered), plaintiff might understandably wish to pursue 
his claim in his home state rather than traveling to Delaware or New Jersey (much less Ger-
many). But pursuant to Daimler, the U.S. Supreme Court might well require this trip of 
plaintiff, even without the agency and parent-subsidiary questions present in the actual 
Daimler case. 
179  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (citation omitted). 
180  In essence, plaintiffs in Daimler were attempting, without first demonstrating alter ego 
status, that a German parent company was responsible for a foreign subsidiary’s complicity 
with an authoritarian regime related to the subsidiary’s suburban manufacturing facility (the 
“incidents recounted in [plaintiffs’] complaint center on MB Argentina’s plant in Gonzalez 
Catan, [outside of Buenos Aires] Argentina.” Id. at 751–52) on another continent, eight 
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long-term impact on questions of general jurisdiction. But Goodyear and Daim-
ler in combination give defense counsel substantial ammunition for fighting as-
sertions of general personal jurisdiction. Both cases also serve as a cautionary 
tale for counsel. By pushing too hard to expand the boundaries of general per-
sonal jurisdiction (to sue a European subsidiary of a U.S. company in North 
Carolina [Goodyear]181 and to sue a European parent company in the U.S. 
based on the American subsidiary for conduct by an Argentine subsidiary 
[Daimler]), counsel produced precedents that appear to contract the potential 
reach of general personal jurisdiction for litigants in the future. 
The clear message of Goodyear and Daimler is that the Court (almost 
unanimously) is resistant to broad exercises of general personal jurisdiction, 
even as applied to some of the world’s largest companies. Although obtaining 
general personal jurisdiction in the state of incorporation or managerial head-
quarters is certain, anything beyond that has become debatable in the wake of 
these two cases, perhaps even for a U.S.-based company operating scores of 
retail outlets in an adjacent state.182 Clearly the Court is concerned about sub-
                                                                                                                                
thousand miles from Daimler’s Stuttgart headquarters. One can understand the Court’s re-
sistance to the concept, but it is resistance based not only on concerns about overbroad asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction but also upon plaintiffs’ substantive theory of liability in the 
case, as well as plaintiffs’ argument that a subsidiary’s pervasive contacts with the forum 
state equated to the parent being vulnerable to suit in the forum state even over matters bear-
ing no relation to the forum state. Because of the unusual posture of the case, Justice So-
tomayor concurred in the result only. See id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). In particular, Justice Sotomayor found the majority opinion too sweeping as well as 
unwisely moving away from the Court’s traditional “continuous and systematic” activity test 
for general jurisdiction to one of whether the forum state sufficiently counts as the defend-
ant’s “home.” In this way, she argued, a defendant with even a large amount of regular and 
substantial activity in a state is not subject to general jurisdiction on the de facto ground that 
the defendant’s base of operations is a more apt location. Daimler had conceded that 
MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction at the trial court level, which resulted in no sig-
nificant discovery regarding parent Daimler’s general contact with California, which Justice 
Sotomayor viewed as a problem because the Court had decided “the issue without a devel-
oped record.” Id. at 764–67. 
181  But at least the Goodyear plaintiffs (parents of children killed in an accident occasioned 
by an alleged tire defect) were from North Carolina. Daimler, however well intentioned as a 
means of attacking human rights abuses, involved rather untethered forum shopping, perhaps 
in defiance of logic. If Mercedes-Benz Argentina personnel were collaborating with a mur-
derous regime in order to facilitate business in that country, would they really expose their 
collaboration with an evil regime by reporting it to the parent company in Germany? And 
would top management really bless such activity? Or would a reasonable factfinder conclude 
that the German parent should have been aware of misconduct by the Argentine subsidiary, 
or at least some employees of the Argentine subsidiary? It seems unlikely, but stranger and 
more awful things have happened, which perhaps supports Justice Sotomayor’s view that 
greater discovery was in order regarding Daimler’s connections to its subsidiaries. 
182  Goodyear and Daimler leave open the question of what location constitutes corporate 
headquarters, particularly in a world where technical legal status seems to diverge from reali-
ty regarding the locus of corporate activity. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Banks Cash In on 
Mergers Intended to Elude Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014, at B1, col. 1 (noting recent 
trend motivated by tax avoidance in which U.S. companies become “headquartered” abroad 
even though major operations generating profits are physically in the United States). This 
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jecting even these well-heeled defendants (who can offload defense and settle-
ment to insurers and in-house counsel or firms on retainer) to suit in states more 
removed from core company operations or identity. Logically, then, the Court 
should be similarly concerned about equally broad assertions of general juris-
diction over an individual with only passing physical presence in a state with 
which the defendant has little or no contact. 
D. Walden v. Fiore 
In Walden v. Fiore,183 the Court continued the prevailing approach to spe-
cific jurisdiction. Like in Nicastro, the Court indicated that although obtaining 
specific personal jurisdiction was easier than obtaining general jurisdiction, 
there remain substantial limits on the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant who has not been physically present in the forum state. The 
case began when the eventual plaintiffs were stopped in the Atlanta airport and 
questioned about the large amount of cash they carried. Plaintiffs responded 
that they were professional gamblers returning from Puerto Rico with their re-
cent winnings. Law enforcement officials were nonetheless sufficiently con-
cerned about a possibly illegal source of the money, and they impounded the 
cash. Plaintiffs continued on their journey home to Nevada, where they eventu-
ally obtained the return of the funds but sued for injuries. In particular, they 
claimed that defendant Walden, a police officer from Covington, Georgia, dep-
utized to work as a DEA agent at the airport, had made a knowingly false affi-
davit that had impeded and delayed the eventual return of the funds, causing 
injury to plaintiffs in the forum state of Nevada.184 
The Court found the asserted basis for specific personal jurisdiction to be 
insufficient in that the defendant had not done enough that was sufficiently di-
rected toward the forum state. It held that the defendant must be the one to cre-
ate contact with the forum state and that those contacts must be with the forum 
state itself, not merely with people who reside there.185 In this way, the Court 
distinguished Officer Walden’s situation from that of the National Enquirer re-
porter in Calder v. Jones,186 who had worked on an allegedly defamatory article 
about a California-based actress from Florida but had made numerous tele-
phone contacts to California as part of writing the article. In addition, the im-
pact of the article in Calder was felt in California, where it was read by Cali-
fornians, whereas the harm done to the Fiore plaintiffs was more confined in 
                                                                                                                                
and similar developments regarding corporate organizational form, many of which post-date 
Professor Twitchell’s influential article (Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 52), sug-
gest that it would be unwise to restrict general jurisdiction to only locations of incorporation 
or main headquarters and that general jurisdiction also should properly lie in any state where 
an entity defendant has nontrivial continuous and systematic presence. 
183  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
184  Id. at 1120. 
185  Id. at 1122. 
186  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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impact187 (although clearly more acute to them than the impact on readers of a 
defamatory story). Viewed as a whole, the defendant simply lacked sufficient 
minimum contacts with Nevada to make a Nevada court’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion over him consistent with fair play and substantial justice.188 
Notwithstanding the parameters of Nicastro and Fiore, courts have upheld 
specific personal jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant injecting its goods 
into the “stream of commerce” with clear intent to serve markets in the forum 
state.189 Courts have also allowed suit to proceed when the defendant was en-
gaging in conduct that had distinctly targeted the forum state or had reasonably 
foreseeable effects in the forum state.190 Similarly, where a defendant from an-
other jurisdiction has intentionally hacked into a computer system in the forum 
state, personal jurisdiction has been found for an action arising out of misap-
propriation of trade secrets facilitated by the hacking.191 Thus, although litiga-
tors should take note of the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions arguably 
constricting specific personal jurisdiction, any such shift appears modest, with 
courts continuing to permit generally expansive exercises of personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants causing injury to plaintiffs in the forum 
state.192 In contrast to Goodyear, Nicastro, and Daimler, Fiore appears to have 
been met with a collective yawn by commentators, with little criticism.193 
                                                        
187  Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–25. 
188  Id. at 1126. 
189  See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013). But see Kason 
Indus., Inc. v. Dent Design Hardware, Ltd., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (plain-
tiff’s failure to aver any patent infringement by defendant in forum state; also no general ju-
risdiction because plaintiff averred no defendant incorporation, headquarters, or other sub-
stantial presence in forum state; mere sales, even if extensive, insufficient to confer general 
personal jurisdiction). 
190  See, e.g., Wash. Shoe Co. v. A–Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(Arkansas corporation could be sued for copyright infringement in Washington, where the 
state copyright holder was located, even when defendant had no other contact with Washing-
ton, because infringement had impact in Washington). 
191  See MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012) (Canadian employee’s use 
of Connecticut employer’s computer system, which had server physically located in Con-
necticut, was sufficient minimum contacts to support specific personal jurisdiction). Howev-
er, a Canadian broker who was providing services through the conventional means of tele-
phone and mail and directing shipments of goods that entered the state but were not directly 
shipped and who had never visited Missouri was found not to be subject to personal jurisdic-
tion there. See Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Bassett & Walker Int’l, Inc., 702 F.3d 472 (8th 
Cir. 2012). 
192  Regarding general jurisdiction, the combination of Goodyear and Daimler is likely to 
provide more support for dismissal motions that the more modest narrowing of the specific 
jurisdiction concept reflected in Nicastro and Walden v. Fiore. Compare Sonera Holding 
B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting application of gen-
eral jurisdiction over large Turkish conglomerate doing substantial business in the U.S. be-
cause defendant is not “essentially at home” in the U.S. within the meaning of Goodyear and 
Daimler) with In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d 576 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (holding specific jurisdiction proper in Virginia over Chinese manufacturer of 
allegedly defective building materials; defendant purposefully availed itself of benefits of 
doing business in forum state by directly selling to builders); Beverage v. Pullman & Com-
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CONCLUSION: TIME TO END TO THE MYTH AND CURRENT FRAGMENTED 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION METHODOLOGY 
To again invoke a Holmes aphorism, “a page of history is worth a volume 
of logic.”194 Nonetheless, one would have thought that tag jurisdiction could 
not survive after International Shoe replaced territorial hegemony with a per-
sonal jurisdiction inquiry based on reasonable and fair connection between the 
defendants, the forum, and the action. One would have reasonably felt even 
more confident about this after Shaffer v. Heitner subjected quasi-in-rem juris-
diction to minimum contacts analysis and drastically reduced its availability, 
utility, and role in modern litigation. 
But history, tradition, inertia, and confusion have combined to maintain tag 
jurisdiction long after it should have died. Like Holmes’ clavicle of the cat, tag 
jurisdiction, whatever its benefits in the pre-industrial world, survived without 
any significant evolution of its function and became unnecessary for legitimate 
exercises of personal jurisdiction but available for misuse. It remains largely a 
means for ambushing opponents in seeking to gain a tactical geographic or doc-
trinal advantage over a defendant who could not otherwise satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement for suit in plaintiff’s chosen forum state. 
Perhaps more troubling is that tag jurisdiction is a form of ambush that can 
be inflicted upon individual defendants—including those most likely to be 
harmed by facing litigation in a distant, inconvenient, or hostile forum—but not 
upon corporate entities, even though most such entities are in a far better posi-
tion for defending claims. 
Like something from a bad zombie movie, tag jurisdiction survives. It 
showed resilience in the lower courts after International Shoe and Shaffer v. 
Heitner, and then it received surprising support from nearly half the Supreme 
Court in Burnham.195 An odd diffusion of legal misinformation then created a 
mythology that increased the precedential influence of Burnham far beyond the 
parameters of the Court’s opinion and in apparent defiance of weak argument 
favoring continued use of pure tag jurisdiction.196 
Although perhaps not as mythic as some cases or topics, the Burnham my-
thology has been equally or more irrepressible.197 Ask the average lawyer or 
judge today (and perhaps even the average law professor) whether tag jurisdic-
                                                                                                                                
ley, LLC, 316 P.3d 590 (Ariz. 2014) (upholding exercise of specific jurisdiction over Con-
necticut lawyer and law firm based on provision of opinion letter regarding tax-shelter to 
Arizona residents). 
193  For example, in the wake of the Walden v. Fiore decision, a string of emails on the 
AALS Civil Procedure listserve contained roughly forty comments about the case, none par-
ticularly negative and most characterizing the decision as consistent with prevailing prece-
dent on specific personal jurisdiction. Academic commentary on Walden v. Fiore to date has 
been largely descriptive and not critical, in contrast to scholarly assessments of the other 
three cases. 
194  N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
195  See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text. 
196  See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
197  See supra note * (sources using “irrepressible” mythology analysis). 
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tion based on service alone—even for the defendant with no other contacts 
aside from merely passing through (or over) the forum state—is constitutional 
and almost all will agree, with most referencing the three-justice Scalia opinion 
in Burnham, even if they cannot remember the case by name. As discussed 
above, Burnham’s mythic status is undeserved and it cannot fairly be said to 
have validated tag jurisdiction. But even without benefit of an overbroad read-
ing of Burnham, lower courts were already applying tag jurisdiction inappro-
priately in cases such as Grace v. MacArthur.198 
Tag jurisdiction and the Burnham Court’s failure to invalidate or tame it in 
the manner that Shaffer tamed quasi-in-rem jurisdiction has long been a bit of 
an embarrassment to a legal system that prides itself on rationality, consistency, 
and even fairness—particularly fairness to absent defendants. The Court’s latest 
decisions in Goodyear, Nicastro, Daimler, and Walden v. Fiore—all of which 
should cause great unease for fairness to the defendant, particularly concerning 
attempted exercise of general jurisdiction—have made pure tag jurisdiction and 
the Scalia position even more indefensible.199 
Some courts continue to uphold tag jurisdiction even though it is incon-
sistent with a defendant-centered due process emphasis on the ground that In-
ternational Shoe, notwithstanding its shift from a territorial focus to a due pro-
cess focus, was nonetheless an opinion that expanded jurisdiction as a practical 
matter. In particular, jurisdiction over nonresident, non-domiciliary corpora-
tions was expanded based on their business activity directed toward the state, at 
least if the claim had a sufficient connection to that business activity. Most of 
the post-International Shoe cases on jurisdiction (e.g., McGee, Burger King, 
Calder v. Jones, Keeton v. Hustler) can be fitted to this view.200 
Although World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi Metal constrict jurisdiction, 
the former can be explained as protecting local retailers from unfair exercises 
of personal jurisdiction in a distant forum based merely on the mobility of the 
products they sell locally. Moreover, the latter can be explained by the attenu-
ated connection between the defendant and the forum state by the absence of 
any significant U.S. interest in the dispute once the American plaintiff’s claim 
was resolved, leaving only an indemnity action between a Taiwanese tire com-
pany and a Japanese air valve maker.201 
But with Nicastro, the Court arguably took a significant step back from ex-
pansive exercises of jurisdiction over a nonresident company. Defendant McIn-
tyre was voluntarily operating in the United States with the intent of putting its 
products in states like New Jersey, where the underlying claim arose, even if 
McIntyre’s marketing had not specifically targeted New Jersey. The Court 
                                                        
198  See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the surprising notoriety of and support for MacArthur, 
despite being clearly erroneous under an International Shoe analysis and arguably incorrect 
under a Pennoyer territoriality analysis as well). 
199  See supra Part III (discussing recent Supreme Court cases and their inconsistency with 
continued use of tag jurisdiction). 
200  See supra notes 7–16, 51–52 and accompanying text (reviewing modern personal juris-
diction precedent). 
201  See supra note 55 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi Metal). 
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nonetheless prevented the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over this de-
fendant clearly doing business in the United States and trying to reach states 
like New Jersey.202 
Regarding the issue of defendant convenience, although New Jersey is a 
long way from England, it is considerably closer than Las Vegas and other 
parts of the United States where McIntyre had been happy to travel in search of 
sales. Further, the Nicastro Court appeared never to consider the practicalities 
of litigation by a domestic individual against a foreign corporation, especially 
one located some distance from the United States. If forced to defend on the 
merits in New Jersey, McIntyre would in all likelihood simply obtain a defense 
from its liability insurer, which would also provide coverage for any judgments 
against McIntyre. In all likelihood, McIntyre’s challenge to personal jurisdic-
tion was funded by its liability insurer. Under such circumstances, concerns 
about the “unfairness” of an insured corporate defendant facing suit outside its 
home state seem overwrought. 
For a number of reasons, Nicastro provides rather substantial protection for 
businesses seeking to avoid specific personal jurisdiction. By contrast, an indi-
vidual accosted via service of process while temporarily in a forum receives no 
judicial scrutiny of the fairness or reasonableness of such exercises of jurisdic-
tion. Although the disconnect between the Court’s modern specific jurisdiction 
cases and tag jurisdiction is bad enough, the Court’s recent general jurisdiction 
cases of Goodyear and Daimler create an even more problematic gap between 
the Court’s treatment of businesses best able to respond to suits away from 
home and the Court’s lack of sympathy for the “tagged” transient defendant.203 
Too often overlooked in discussions of transient jurisdiction is that it (1) 
operates in the nature of general jurisdiction but (2) only applies to natural per-
sons. Once tagged, the transient defendant can be sued in the state of service for 
anything. But only individuals can be tagged.204 Efforts to establish personal 
jurisdiction over an entity by personal service upon even a high ranking officer, 
director, or employee of a company is almost universally held to be ineffective 
to establish personal jurisdiction over the entity, even if the claim arises out of 
entity activity in the forum state. In effect, the American legal system currently 
gives corporate and other entity defendants a universal right to argue fairness, 
reasonableness, and due process, but it denies that same right to individuals 
tagged with personal service while in transit. 
                                                        
202  See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing Nicastro). 
203  See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (discussing Goodyear) and supra notes 
171–82 and accompanying text (discussing Daimler). 
204  In some cases natural persons with designated agency status can be served and this will 
be effective to establish jurisdiction over the entity. Many long-arm statutes, which provide 
that the company designates the Secretary of State or another government official to be the 
agent for service, could be construed in this way. But—importantly—even if the entity’s 
agent is served in the forum state, the entity is normally permitted to contest jurisdiction pur-
suant to an International Shoe analysis. And Shaffer v. Heitner clearly protects entities 
against the possibility that they will be “held up” by plaintiffs attaching their forum state 
property as part of an exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 
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Pursuant to Goodyear and Daimler, a business defendant with vast opera-
tions within a state can argue that it need only face lawsuits in that state related 
to those operations or related to the underlying lawsuit. Certainly, sales alone in 
the forum state are not sufficient to support an exercise of general personal ju-
risdiction. Goodyear and particularly Daimler were quite specific on that point. 
Even if subsequent decisions treat other business operations (e.g., retail 
outlets, warehouses, distribution networks) as supporting general jurisdiction, 
when sales alone would not, the Supreme Court has now created a world in 
which the largest, wealthiest litigants, who are most readily able to defend 
themselves, receive substantial due process empathy from the Court, while 
transient individuals receive almost none. To the extent that subsequent deci-
sions read Daimler and Goodyear as permitting general jurisdiction over a 
company only in the states of corporate domicile and company headquarters, 
the inequitable treatment of human beings and entities becomes so pronounced 
as to invite ridicule. 
For roughly three decades, commentators have consistently criticized the 
Supreme Court’s work in the area of personal jurisdiction as producing unhelp-
ful, inconsistent, and unnecessary precedents.205 Goodyear, Nicastro, and 
Daimler have only given more support to the already well-supplied critics. In 
view of the profession’s general dissatisfaction with the law in this area and the 
increasingly inequitable and anachronistic presence of transient jurisdiction, the 
time is ripe for reviving proposals for a more unitary approach to jurisdiction. 
Such an approach would likely not differentiate between modes of establishing 
the jurisdiction and whether it is deemed general or specific. 
Over the past sixty years, scholars have suggested such a unitary ap-
proach—one in which fairness and reasonableness analysis was front-and-
center in a due process/minimum contacts analysis applicable to all cases.206 A 
                                                        
205  For a particularly pithy summary written prior to the Court’s most recent forays into the 
area (which in my view have exacerbated rather than alleviated the problems noted by the 
author) see Borchers, supra note 155: 
The Court has held that a corporate trustee can get jurisdiction over the beneficiaries in the 
trustee’s home state, but not vice versa. Child support claimants are not necessarily entitled to 
litigate the support issue in their own state, unless, of course, they manage to tag the defendant 
while she passes through the state. A shareholder wishing to sue a large corporation’s directors 
for bad corporate management is not necessarily entitled to litigate in the state of incorporation, 
but a large corporation can drag one of its nickel-and-dime franchisees to the corporation’s home 
state. Products liability suits almost always require more than one suit if the plaintiff wants to 
sue all of the defendants in the chain of distribution. American plaintiffs suing foreign defend-
ants are not necessarily entitled to an American forum, even if the defendant purchases the in-
strument of injury in America. Plaintiffs in actions for defamation, a constitutionally regulated 
and supposedly disfavored tort, can pick and choose among forums, but other tort plaintiffs can-
not. Purely fictional factors, such as whether the forum state has enacted a “special” jurisdiction-
al statute, count heavily, but practical factors, such as the fact that the defense is being conducted 
by the insurer, count for nothing. 
Id. at 101–02 (footnotes omitted) (concluding that this state of affairs suggests the Court has 
not been doing “serious adult effort” regarding personal jurisdiction). 
206  See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 40 (focus of personal jurisdiction inquiry should be 
reasonable convenience for defendant and other parties in light of the litigation); Harold S. 
Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform 
Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984) (arguing for determination of jurisdiction based on 
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full review of such proposals is beyond the scope of this article, but such an ap-
proach seems an obvious antidote to the increasing tension between restrictions 
upon personal jurisdiction over corporations but continued use of tag general 
personal jurisdiction over individuals. The reform proposals are largely con-
sistent and generally devolve to the following concept that I propose be used in 
place of the current splintered approach to personal jurisdiction: 
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant (individual or entity) 
should depend upon whether the defendant has adequate notice and opportunity 
to be heard in a forum that is fair and reasonable in light of the defendant’s con-
nection to the forum, with due consideration also given to the burdens on the de-
fendant and the forum’s connection to the plaintiff, the litigation, and other in-
terested persons or entities, as well as the practicalities of litigation in the forum 
state and the availability of alternative forums. 
To be sure, the outcomes of cases applying this standard will vary accord-
ing to both the facts of the case and the sensibilities of the particular bench rul-
ing on the personal jurisdiction dispute. But such variance already occurs under 
the supposedly more precise but operationally more confused structure that the 
Court has erected during the past thirty-five years. It is hard to imagine any 
more disjointed or disappointing results using the simplified and unified stand-
ard set forth above, or any of the similar variants suggested by wiser commen-
tators over the years. 
Adopting this type of unified approach to questions of personal jurisdiction 
would make the distinctions between general and specific jurisdiction unneces-
sary, provide greater uniformity in the treatment of individual and entity de-
fendants, and reduce unfairness. This methodology would still take a broad ap-
proach to jurisdiction and even permit the use of expansive exercises of 
jurisdiction where warranted to provide a forum for resolving disputes and ren-
dering relief. 
Consistently taking this sort of unified and due process-centered approach 
would also likely have at least one very tangible benefit: it would almost cer-
tainly strike down the use of pure tag jurisdiction, save in special circumstanc-
es, and terminate the irrepressible myth of Burnham. Rather than accepting tag 
jurisdiction as a given, it would largely bar the practice except when thought 
necessary to prevent a defendant from escaping the reach of the rule of law. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                
defendant expectations and benefits received by defendant through forum state activity); 
Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 74 (suggesting that personal jurisdiction be based on 
fairness, convenience, and efficiency); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 52, at 782–83 
(although continuing to preserve distinction between specific and general personal jurisdic-
tion, emphasizing “legitimate exercise of power by sovereign states” over defendant as met-
ric for assessing reasonableness of exercise of jurisdiction); Wasserman, supra note 82 (indi-
rectly suggesting that all exercises of personal jurisdiction should be assessed according to 
defendant, fairness, and convenience in light of specific case). 
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